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Does Crawford Provide a Stable 
Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine? 
Roger W. Kirst† 
The United States Supreme Court presented a new 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
in Crawford v. Washington.1  In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Scalia examined the historical background of the 
Clause to determine the original meaning of its text.  He 
concluded from the historical record that the primary object of 
the Clause was preventing the prosecution from using 
testimonial hearsay.  Justice Scalia rejected the interpretation 
of the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts2 that allowed the 
prosecution to use testimonial hearsay upon a judicial finding 
that it was reliable.  He concluded that testimonial hearsay can 
be used by the prosecution only if the declarant is unavailable 
to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant. 
The Court in Crawford unanimously reversed the state 
judgment, but the Court was not unanimous in support of 
Justice Scalia’s interpretation and application of the history of 
confrontation.  Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the 
judgment in an opinion joined by Justice O’Connor.3  The Chief 
Justice presented his own review of the historical record to 
support his argument that Justice Scalia’s approach was based 
on the wrong distinction, too categorical, and unnecessary to 
decide the case.  The Chief Justice did not argue that the 
statement in Crawford was admissible.  Nor did he argue for 
the admissibility of any particular statement that might be 
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 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 3 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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excluded under the testimonial interpretation presented by 
Justice Scalia. 
The impact of Crawford is not the result of what the 
Court actually did.  Its unanimous reversal of a conviction 
based in part on a custodial statement of an accomplice who did 
not testify at trial was consistent with the Court’s prior 
Confrontation Clause decisions.4  Justice Scalia used a new 
label in describing the statement as testimonial hearsay, but 
the Supreme Court had never allowed the prosecution to use 
such hearsay without confrontation.  Although Justice Scalia 
listed several state and federal decisions that had interpreted 
Roberts as allowing judicial screening for reliability to 
overcome a lack of confrontation,5 that interpretation of Roberts 
had never been used by the Supreme Court to affirm a 
conviction.  The Chief Justice said he dissented from the 
decision to overrule Roberts,6 but Justice Scalia did not say 
Roberts was overruled.  Instead, Justice Scalia included 
Roberts among the Court’s cases in which the results were 
largely consistent with the principles he derived from the 
historical record.7 
The impact of Crawford comes from Justice Scalia’s 
emphasis that the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted 
according to its original meaning, his conclusion that 
testimonial hearsay was at least the primary object of the Sixth 
Amendment and perhaps its sole concern, and his suggestion 
that the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements should be used to organize confrontation doctrine.  
Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of this distinction by 
commenting that it could be consistent with the Framers’ 
design to exempt nontestimonial statements from any 
confrontation requirement.8  Justice Scalia did not provide a 
complete definition of a testimonial statement, and he did not 
explain what the confrontation rule might be for 
nontestimonial statements if there should be one.  Those gaps 
have left other courts to struggle as they try to rebuild 
confrontation doctrine on Crawford’s combination of the 
testimonial interpretation, original meaning, and history. 
  
 4 See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415 (1965). 
 5 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-65. 
 6 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 7 Id. at 58 (majority opinion). 
 8 Id. at 68. 
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Confrontation doctrine does not have to be completely 
rebuilt after Crawford, and it does not have to be rebuilt on the 
basis of Crawford alone.  Justice Scalia discussed most of the 
Supreme Court’s prior confrontation cases when he explained 
why the testimonial interpretation was not inconsistent with 
the holdings in those cases.  His statement that his objections 
were directed only to the rationales in some decisions confirms 
that most prior doctrine should be still valid after Crawford.  
Part I of this Article will review the evolution of confrontation 
doctrine in the Supreme Court in order to describe the pre-
Crawford history that is essential to understanding Crawford 
and its effect. 
Crawford must be read carefully.  All the cases Justice 
Scalia used to illustrate the vice of the Roberts test were 
decided by state and federal appellate courts; none were from 
the Supreme Court.  That means Crawford should have less 
effect on the confrontation doctrine the Court had already 
established even if it will require substantial changes in the 
ways some other courts had been interpreting the Court’s 
opinions.  It is also important to recognize where Justice 
Scalia’s effort to outline the full sweep of the testimonial 
interpretation did not completely summarize all the limitations 
and conditions of the Court’s confrontation doctrine.  Part II of 
this Article will review Crawford and identify areas where the 
summary in Crawford is not necessarily a complete statement 
of established confrontation doctrine. 
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause emphasized English common law.  He 
described the civil-law mode of criminal procedure and the use 
of ex parte examinations as the practices used in the notorious 
English treason cases, the practices invited by the English 
Marian statutes, and the practices targeted by the English 
right of confrontation.9  Justice Scalia explained his reliance on 
English history by declaring that the Confrontation Clause “is 
most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation 
at common law.”10  Justice Scalia also described controversial 
examination practices that were used in the Colonies and listed 
the declarations of rights adopted around the time of the 
Revolution that guaranteed a right of confrontation.11  He 
  
 9 Id. at 50. 
 10 Id. at 54. 
 11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-48. 
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connected the English history to the Sixth Amendment by 
describing the English experience as the practices “the 
founding-era rhetoric decried.”12  He concluded that there could 
not be a reliability exception for a statement that would be the 
modern equivalent of an abuse at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed. 
Justice Scalia used the historical opposition to ex parte 
testimony as evidence that the original concern addressed by 
the Clause was primarily or even exclusively testimonial 
hearsay.13  He did not present any founding-era evidence that 
explicitly confirms that the Framers had no concern with 
nontestimonial hearsay.  Justice Scalia’s conclusion rests on 
silence in the historical record.  Silence alone can be 
misinterpreted if the record is read with an erroneous 
assumption about the context.  The question framed by Justice 
Scalia was based on an implicit assumption that the purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause was excluding some hearsay.  He did 
not discuss whether the Framers might have had a different 
purpose.  An alternative interpretation of the ratification 
history that produced the Sixth Amendment is that the 
Framers intended to protect confrontation; excluding hearsay 
was only an effect and not its sole purpose.  When the 
ratification history is read without an assumption about the 
question it will answer, the silence of the Framers about the 
details of the hearsay rule suggests the original meaning was 
not limited to testimonial hearsay.  Part III of this Article will 
discuss why the ratification history shows that the 
Confrontation Clause is not a reference to the English common 
law of hearsay; the Clause requires confrontation. 
The ratification history also shows that the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause did not include specific 
confrontation rules.  It would be more accurate to describe the 
original meaning as a process in which the courts would 
develop and apply rules that protect the right of confrontation.  
The Supreme Court’s pre-Crawford opinions have provided a 
foundation for this process by identifying two elements of the 
right of confrontation.  One element was described more than a 
century ago in Mattox v. United States as the ability of the jury 
to look at a witness and “judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is 
  
 12 Id. at 50. 
 13 Id. 
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worthy of belief.”14  Justice White in California v. Green 
described the same element when he considered whether the 
trier of fact had “a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of 
the prior statement.”15  That element also appeared in Dutton 
v. Evans,16 Mancusi v. Stubbs,17 and Roberts v. Ohio.18  The 
Court in Mattox also described a second element of the right of 
confrontation as the defendant’s opportunity for “testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness.”19  More 
recently, Justice Blackmun in Roberts described a purpose of 
confrontation as “ensuring the defendant an effective means to 
test adverse evidence.”20  That element was also included in Lee 
v. Illinois.21  Together, these two elements define a purpose of 
confrontation as protecting the defendant’s ability to contest 
the evidence before the factfinder.  Part IV of this Article will 
describe how these two elements provide a foundation for 
developing confrontation limits on hearsay evidence that are 
consistent with the Framers’ purpose of protecting the right of 
confrontation. 
The history of confrontation doctrine in the Supreme 
Court has been a search for an interpretation that is both 
consistent with the historical record and readily usable in the 
courtroom in a criminal trial.  That search has been 
complicated by the inevitable distortion that is created as other 
courts convert the Court’s doctrine to shorthand tests.  The 
idea of indicia of reliability discussed in Roberts provided too 
little guidance when it was reduced to a reliability test.  The 
testimonial interpretation may also lead to distortions if 
confrontation doctrine is refined using only the guidance found 
in Crawford. 
As trial and appellate courts develop the labels 
presented in Crawford, they can rebuild confrontation doctrine 
with workable tests that are consistent with the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause if they ask whether the 
defendant has an effective means to test adverse evidence and 
whether the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
  
 14 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). 
 15 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). 
 16 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
 17 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). 
 18 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). 
 19 156 U.S. at 242. 
 20 448 U.S. at 65. 
 21 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986). 
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a statement.  These two elements do not require judicial 
balancing at trial for each statement.  They permit the 
appellate courts to define the types of statements a defendant 
would be able to contest before the factfinder.  The two 
elements avoid the need to research arcane questions about 
English common law.  They draw attention to the actual word 
in the Sixth Amendment, confronted, instead of requiring 
inferences from a word that is not in the text, such as 
testimony.  The two elements are supported by the ratification 
history that led to the Sixth Amendment.  They are consistent 
with the results of all the Court’s confrontation cases from 
Reynolds v. United States22 through Crawford.  Of equal 
importance, they help explain the results in those cases and 
show how the Court’s decisions can be extended to cover new 
facts.  Focusing on the purpose of confrontation does not mean 
prosecutors will never be able to use prior statements.  This 
focus identifies reasons a statement might be admissible even 
though the defendant cannot confront the declarant at trial in 
the usual manner of cross-examination, and reasons a court 
should exclude some statements if the declarant is not 
available for confrontation before the factfinder.  Part V of this 
Article will describe how the Court’s two elements of the 
purpose of confrontation can be used to understand the 
confrontation doctrine the Court had developed before 
Crawford and to develop new confrontation rules for the 
questions the Court left unanswered in Crawford. 
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Crawford cannot be understood without considering the 
history that preceded it.  Any effort by the Supreme Court to 
describe an overall theory of confrontation has been rather 
recent as well as occasional.  The Confrontation Clause was 
adopted in 1791.  For the next 174 years, the United States 
Supreme Court applied it in only a few federal criminal cases.23  
Some of the Court’s opinions included comments about the 
purpose of the Clause,24 but no opinion tried to provide an 
overall theory of confrontation.  The Confrontation Clause 
began to get more attention in 1965, when the Court held in 
  
 22 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 23 See, e.g., Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 467 (1900); Kirby v. United 
States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158. 
 24 See infra notes 333-44 and accompanying text. 
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Pointer v. Texas that a defendant in a state trial was entitled 
“to be tried in accordance with the protections of the 
confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment” under the 
standards that would govern a federal trial.25  In his majority 
opinion in Pointer, Justice Black followed the conventional 
style by focusing on the facts; he did not describe an overall 
theory of confrontation.  That style allowed the Court to decide 
Pointer and the next few cases26 without the need to anticipate 
every issue that might be raised by different facts, but it 
provided little guidance for new fact situations.  The search for 
a more complete theory of the Confrontation Clause began in 
1970. 
A. Justice Harlan’s Dilemma 
The first effort by any Justice to describe an overall 
scope and structure for the right of confrontation came in 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in California v. Green.27  
Green differed in two ways from every prior confrontation 
decision of the Supreme Court.  It was the first time the Court 
reviewed a case in which another court had found a 
confrontation violation, and it was the first time the Court 
concluded that another court had read the Clause too broadly.  
In Green, the California Supreme Court had interpreted the 
Court’s then-recent confrontation decisions as requiring that 
cross-examination occur at the same time as the statement was 
made.28  The United States Supreme Court rejected the 
requirement of contemporaneous cross-examination and 
reversed the state court.29  In his majority opinion, Justice 
White focused on two issues – when the prosecution could use 
prior cross-examined testimony of an unavailable witness30 and 
when the prosecution could use a prior statement of a witness 
who is subject to adequate cross-examination at trial.31  He did 
not try to describe a broader principle that would include both 
specific rules. 
  
 25 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
 26 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968). 
 27 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 28 People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 426 (Cal. 1969). 
 29 California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164, 170. 
 30 Id. at 165-68. 
 31 Id. at 162-64, 168-70. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan wrote that 
other courts needed more guidance than provided in Justice 
White’s opinion and that it was important to dispel the 
misconception that confrontation should be equated with cross-
examination.32  Justice Harlan framed the question as 
“whether and to what extent the Sixth Amendment 
‘constitutionalizes’ the hearsay rule of the common law.”33 
Justice Harlan began his analysis in Green by 
identifying two polar readings of the Confrontation Clause.  At 
one pole, the Clause would have little or no effect if it were 
read “to confer nothing more than a right to meet face to face 
all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”34  At the other 
pole, the Clause would have too much effect if it was 
“interpreted as a blanket prohibition on the use of any hearsay 
testimony.”35  After rejecting both polar readings, Justice 
Harlan still had to find a way to distinguish between 
admissible hearsay and hearsay that would create a 
constitutional violation. 
Justice Harlan first identified a broad principle that did 
not tie the Clause to the hearsay rule. He tentatively concluded 
that the Clause was meant “to constitutionalize a barrier 
against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and 
absentee witnesses,” which would be supplemented by judicial 
application of evidence rules.36  He proposed that the 
availability of the declarant should be the test for defining the 
right of confrontation.37  He then cataloged several Supreme 
Court decisions in order to show that confrontation had not 
been equated with cross-examination and that these holdings 
supported the requirement that the prosecution produce any 
available witness.38 
Later the same year, Justice Harlan decided that 
making availability the sole and controlling principle for 
confrontation doctrine would be a mistake.  His approach in 
Green would have meant there was a confrontation violation in 
Dutton v. Evans, but Justice Harlan instead wrote another 
concurring opinion to explain why he had provided the fifth 
  
 32 Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 33 Id. at 173. 
 34 Id. at 175. 
 35 Green, 399 U.S. at 175. 
 36 Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 37 Id. at 182-83. 
 38 Id. at 183. 
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vote for rejecting the defendant’s confrontation argument.39  In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan explained that he 
thought a prosecutor should not have to produce every 
available declarant because doing so would be both 
inconvenient and sometimes of little value to a defendant.40  
His specific examples were official statements, learned 
treatises, trade reports, business records, and laboratory 
analyses.41  He apparently could not resolve the dilemma he 
had described in Green because he saw no way to reconcile the 
admission of some hearsay with the “seemingly absolute 
command” of the Confrontation Clause.42  Therefore, he went 
back to one of the polar readings he had rejected in Green and 
concluded in Dutton that the Clause applied only to the “mode 
of procedure,” not to whether the prosecutor could use hearsay 
evidence.43  He proposed as an alternative that state trials 
should be governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause instead of the Confrontation Clause.44 
At the time he wrote, Justice Harlan’s opinion in Green 
was the most substantial discussion of the historical record of 
the Confrontation Clause in any Supreme Court opinion.  He 
explained his inability to find more than “scant information”45 
in the historical record with the well-known comment that “the 
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment.”46  The 
image generated by that comment persists long after the 
statement has become false.  The parchment is not faded.  In 
the decades since Green there has been extensive research into 
every corner of confrontation doctrine.  That research has 
brought forth a substantial body of published material on the 
history of confrontation in criminal procedure, about its history 
as a political idea, about English and American criminal 
procedure before and after the Revolution, and about the 
adoption of the Confrontation Clause.47 
  
 39 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 40 Id. at 95-96. 
 41 Id. at 96. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 94, 95-96. 
 44 Id. at 96-97. 
 45 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 46 Id. at 173-74. 
 47 See, e.g., 30 & 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1997 & 2000); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins 
of the Confrontation Clause:  An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995). 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford described more of 
the historical record than Justice Harlan had sketched in 
Green, but Justice Scalia was trying to resolve the same 
dilemma that Justice Harlan had framed in Green.  Justice 
Scalia was also trying to define the kind of hearsay the Clause 
was meant to exclude.  Crawford demonstrates that the search 
for an overall theory of confrontation is still governed by 
Justice Harlan’s approach to the text of the Clause, even 
though no other Justice has ever endorsed his conclusions in 
either Green or Dutton. 
B. Justice Blackmun’s Theory in Roberts 
Justice Blackmun described his overall theory of 
confrontation in nine paragraphs and six footnotes in Part II of 
Roberts.48  Given the widespread belief that this discussion 
adopted a reliability test for applying the Confrontation 
Clause, it is important to recognize its modest beginnings.  
Part II does not appear to be the major focus of the Roberts 
opinion.  In fact, Justice Blackmun himself did not use the 
theory he described in Part II to organize his discussion of the 
specific issues in the case.  Nor did Justice Blackmun use his 
general theory when he explained the holding of Roberts in 
Parts III and IV.  Three Justices dissented in an opinion by 
Justice Brennan on the specific issue of whether the declarant 
had been shown to be unavailable.49  That dissent did not 
mention Justice Blackmun’s overall theory of confrontation.  As 
a result, Roberts itself provides little explanation of the rules 
Justice Blackmun described.  There is no apparent source in 
any pre-Roberts opinion, book, or law review article for the 
language Justice Blackmun used to describe his overall theory 
in Part II.  Nevertheless, there is still much that can be learned 
from reading Roberts. 
In Roberts, the defendant had been convicted of forgery, 
receiving stolen property, and possession of heroin.50  The 
daughter of the victim was a possible witness on the forgery 
and stolen property charges.  Defense counsel had called her at 
the preliminary hearing, apparently in the hope that she would 
corroborate the defendant’s story that she had given him her 
father’s property.  That hope disappeared as the daughter’s 
  
 48 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-68 (1980). 
 49 Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50 Id. at 58, 60. 
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preliminary hearing testimony refuted the defendant’s story.  
At the time of trial, the daughter could not be found; the 
prosecution used her preliminary hearing testimony that had 
been created by the defense.51  By a vote of 4-3, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that using her prior testimony was a 
confrontation violation even though the daughter was 
unavailable.52  The majority gave two reasons.  The first was 
that the issues and defense strategy are quite different 
between a preliminary hearing and trial.53  The second reason 
was that Justice White’s opinion in California v. Green was not 
controlling since the defense questioning of the witness in 
Roberts was not cross-examination.54 
The Supreme Court rejected both conclusions of the 
state court.  In Part III of Roberts, Justice Blackmun identified 
the controlling precedent as the section of Green in which the 
Court permitted the prosecution to use the prior testimony of 
an unavailable declarant.55  Defense counsel had actually 
questioned the witness in Roberts in a way that followed the 
form and purpose of cross-examination without being limited 
by an objection or judicial ruling.56  Justice Blackmun 
concluded Part III of Roberts by reemphasizing that there was 
no reason to decide the issue differently than it had been 
decided in Green.57  In Part IV of Roberts, Justice Blackmun 
concluded that the facts before the trial court were sufficient to 
show that the daughter was unavailable.58 
The style and scope of Justice Blackmun’s analysis in 
both Parts III and IV are completely consistent with his own 
description of the Court’s “common law tradition” in which “the 
process has been gradual, building on past decisions, drawing 
on new experience, and responding to changing conditions.”59  
The holding in Parts III and IV resolved all the issues raised by 
the parties.  Justice Blackmun said that the Court would not 
decide issues it did not have to reach.60  He did not discuss 
whether the opportunity to cross-examine would suffice by 
  
 51 Id. at 59-60. 
 52 State v. Roberts, 378 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ohio 1978). 
 53 Id. at 496. 
 54 Id. at 497. 
 55 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73. 
 56 Id. at 70-71. 
 57 Id. at 73. 
 58 Id. at  75-77. 
 59 Id. at 64. 
 60 Id. at 70. 
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itself or whether de minimis cross-examination would be 
enough.  He described defense counsel’s questions to illustrate 
that they were the equivalent of “significant cross 
examination,” but he did not suggest any detailed standard for 
the sufficiency of the prior examination.61  Nevertheless, 
Justice Blackmun preceded his analysis of the facts of Roberts 
with Part II of his opinion in which he did not discuss the facts 
at all. 
Justice Blackmun began Part II by framing the issue as 
“the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the 
hearsay rule with its many exceptions.”62  He first considered 
whether the language of the Clause should be read literally to 
require the exclusion of any statement by an absent declarant, 
but he labeled that interpretation as “long rejected as 
unintended and too extreme.”63  Justice Blackmun then 
excluded the possibility that the right of confrontation might 
have no effect on the use of hearsay, because the “historical 
evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the Clause was 
intended to exclude some hearsay.”64  That discussion 
considered and rejected the two polar readings Justice Harlan 
had tried to reconcile in Green and Dutton, although Justice 
Blackmun did not mention that Justice Harlan had previously 
framed this issue. 
Justice Blackmun’s restatement of the difficulty in 
applying the constitutional text brought him to the point where 
Justice Harlan had conceded in Dutton65 that it was impossible 
to draw a line between admissible statements and those that 
would violate the right of confrontation.  Unlike Justice 
Harlan, Justice Blackmun did not concede the task was 
impossible.  Instead he proposed expanding the set of rules.  
His first rule was that in the usual case “the prosecution must 
either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the 
declarant.”66  Justice Blackmun then added a refinement that 
would allow the prosecution to use only statements by 
unavailable declarants that had adequate indicia of 
reliability.67  He described the indicia of reliability as sufficient 
  
 61 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71. 
 62 Id. at 62. 
 63 Id. at 63. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
 66 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 67 Id. at 66. 
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to overcome a confrontation objection if the statement falls 
“within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”68  Finally, he 
suggested a rule for the hearsay that did not fit within a firmly 
rooted exception:  “In other cases, the evidence must be 
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”69 
Justice Blackmun supported his statement that certain 
hearsay exceptions do not create a confrontation violation with 
a footnote that listed two Supreme Court decisions that had 
discussed dying declarations,70 one Court decision that had 
allowed the prosecution to use the cross-examined prior-trial 
testimony of an unavailable witness,71 and a law review 
comment that had endorsed the hearsay exception for business 
and public records.72  He broadened his authority with 
quotations from Green and Dutton about the similar roots and 
values of hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.73  Justice 
Blackmun did not discuss whether his earlier statement of a 
categorical rule that the declarant must be unavailable was 
consistent with his suggestion that business records would 
always bear adequate indicia of reliability.  The purpose of the 
business records exception would be lost if the prosecution had 
to call every person who made the records, but Justice 
Blackmun did not discuss why his confrontation rules made it 
harder for a prosecutor to use business records by requiring 
both unavailability and indicia of reliability. 
Justice Blackmun provided no examples of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  The very lengthy 
footnote attached to that statement contained only his review 
of the scholarly commentary and concluded that its “mutually 
critical character” meant that the Court should continue with 
what he described as its “demonstrated success in steering a 
middle course.”74  Equally important, Justice Blackmun did not 
state that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness would 
allow the prosecution to use a prior statement.  His language is 
  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 66 n.8 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); Mattox, 156 
U.S. at 243-44). 
 71 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8  (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 
(1972)). 
 72 J. Brooks Greer, III, Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Clause, and 
Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 (1970). 
 73 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  
 74 Id. at 68 n.9. 
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phrased carefully to require exclusion if there are no 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, but it does not 
say they will be sufficient.  That phrasing left the question of 
whether anything else might provide indicia of reliability for 
future decisions. 
The “indicia of reliability” label had a short and varying 
history before Justice Blackmun used it in Roberts.  A closer 
look into how the phrase got its start is required to determine 
whether Justice Blackman used it in the reliability-only sense 
that Justice Scalia attacked so strongly in Crawford.  Justice 
White first used the phrase in Green to describe state hearsay 
rules that violated the right of confrontation.75  Next, Justice 
Stewart used the phrase in Dutton in a different sense when he 
summarized the reasons the hearsay statement in the case 
could be admitted without confrontation.76  The label had been 
first used as a test in the way it was used in Roberts by then-
Justice Rehnquist in Mancusi v. Stubbs.77 
In Mancusi, the hearsay was testimony from a prior 
trial that had been given by a witness who had later returned 
to Sweden78 and was unwilling to return for the second trial.79  
Justice Rehnquist used the “indicia of reliability” phrase from 
Dutton in describing what the Court’s decisions had required to 
afford “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the prior statement.”80  He cited the opinion in 
California v. Green for that standard.81  Justice Rehnquist then 
reviewed the facts and concluded that the opportunity to cross-
examine and the actual cross-examination at the first trial 
meant that the transcript “bore sufficient indicia of reliability 
and afforded the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement.”82 
Justice Blackmun’s holding in Roberts applied exactly 
the same rule Justice Rehnquist had stated and followed in 
Mancusi.  In Part III of Roberts, Justice Blackmun rejected a 
defense argument that the Court should weigh the inherent 
  
 75 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). 
 76 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
 77 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89). 
 78 Id. at 209. 
 79 Id. at 212. 
 80 Id. at 213 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89). 
 81 Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 161). 
 82 Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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reliability or unreliability of the hearsay.83  Instead, Justice 
Blackmun said that the adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness and the actual examination meant that the 
transcript “bore sufficient indicia of reliability and afforded the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement.”84 
Justice Blackmun’s general approach in Part II of 
Roberts did not call for a “mere judicial determination of 
reliability,” as Justice Scalia described it in Crawford.85  In 
Roberts, Justice Blackmun used the full phrase of “indicia of 
reliability” four times in three paragraphs.86  Only in the 
concluding reference to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions did he 
shorten the phrase to “reliability.”87  He described “indicia of 
reliability” by quoting Justice Rehnquist’s language from 
Mancusi that included the trier of fact’s basis for evaluating 
the statement.88  Justice Blackmun included an explanation of 
the underlying purpose of the Clause:  “Reflecting its 
underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding 
process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test 
adverse evidence.”89 
The propositions that confrontation requires that the 
defendant be able to test adverse evidence and that the trier of 
fact have a basis for evaluating the truth of a statement do not 
obviously lead to the conclusion that the Clause requires only 
judicial screening for reliability.  The Roberts test Justice 
Scalia rejected in Crawford was well-removed from its 1980 
source. 
The language of Roberts should be read in the context of 
1980, the year the case was decided.  At the time of Roberts the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were still new.  Their eventual 
adoption in 1975 led to a new attitude about the hearsay rule.  
At the very least, the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended 
to remove many of the limits of the hearsay rule by defining 
new hearsay exceptions and expanding existing hearsay 
exceptions.  In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
  
 83 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980). 
 84 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 85 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
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produced a different way of thinking about the hearsay rule.  
Under the common law hearsay rule, a prosecutor in a criminal 
case could not expect to use many out-of-court statements.  The 
prosecutor had to find the witnesses, get them to court, have 
them testify, and allow the defense to cross-examine.  That 
requirement could be avoided only if the prosecution could use 
one of the few hearsay exceptions.  The Supreme Court’s early 
decisions applying the Confrontation Clause to state 
prosecutions did not require a complete theory of confrontation 
for every fact situation.90  The Justices recognized that the 
state prosecutors using accomplice statements were taking 
shortcuts instead of getting the witnesses to testify as they 
should. 
One obvious effect of the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
that codification has made the hearsay exceptions more 
accessible.  Another effect is that the hearsay exceptions can be 
read like a code – as no more than literal categories that can be 
applied without evaluating the policy implications each time 
they are applied.  The hearsay exceptions can be quickly 
expanded by amendments that may appear justified on the 
basis of assumed and limited facts, instead of being developed 
slowly and incrementally on the basis of the varied facts of a 
succession of cases.  The wisdom of codification is not the issue 
here.  Its effects, however, should not be ignored when 
evaluating what Justice Blackmun may have been trying to do 
in Roberts in 1980. 
C. Confrontation Doctrine after Roberts 
In the following decades, the Supreme Court did not 
consistently use Justice Blackmun’s overall theory.  Instead, 
the Court gave more attention to deciding each case by focusing 
on its facts.  The rule in Roberts that any declarant must be 
shown to be unavailable was set aside as too broad.  The 
language in Roberts about a firmly rooted hearsay exception 
was cited in cases that provided illustrations of hearsay 
exceptions that were firmly rooted, but no opinion tried to 
catalogue every exception that was firmly rooted.  The Court 
used the Roberts framework and discussed particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness only in cases that reversed 
convictions, so the Court never identified any facts where the 
  
 90 See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406. 
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guarantees were sufficient to admit the hearsay.  The following 
sections summarize these cases because their details are 
important to assessing whether Crawford presented an 
accurate and complete description of the effect of Roberts. 
1. Unavailability 
Justice Blackmun’s first rule about unavailability was 
quickly abandoned in the Court’s first confrontation case after 
Roberts.  The issue in United States v. Inadi91 was whether the 
prosecution could use statements under the co-conspirator 
exception without showing that the declarant was 
unavailable.92  The Third Circuit had reversed the conviction on 
the ground that Roberts did not include any exception for co-
conspirator statements in its statement of the unavailability 
requirement.93  The first task Justice Powell addressed in his 
opinion for the majority was rejecting Roberts as controlling 
precedent.94  He described Roberts as deciding only whether 
preliminary hearing testimony could be used without 
confrontation at trial.95  He cited Justice Blackmun’s disclaimer 
of  “any intention of proposing a general answer to the many 
difficult questions arising out of the relationship between the 
Confrontation Clause and hearsay.”96  He concluded that 
Roberts “must be read consistently with the question it 
answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts.”97 
After Justice Powell set aside Roberts, he discussed 
whether a co-conspirator statement could be admitted over a 
confrontation objection even if the declarant was available.98  
He distinguished a co-conspirator statement from prior 
testimony and described the context of the conspiracy as 
making a co-conspirator statement “usually irreplaceable as 
substantive evidence.”99  He then concluded that a statement of 
a co-conspirator could be used by the prosecution even if the 
declarant was available to testify.100 
  
 91 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
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 93 United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 94 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392. 
 95 Id. at 392-93. 
 96 Id. at 392. 
 97 Id. at 394. 
 98 Id. at 394-96. 
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Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justice 
Brennan, argued in dissent that the Court had intended in 
Roberts to establish an analytical framework that would be 
applicable to all out-of-court statements.101  Justice Blackmun 
joined Justice Powell’s opinion for the majority; he did not 
comment on Justice Powell’s treatment of Roberts.  The only 
issue in Inadi was whether the prosecution had to show that 
the declarant was unavailable, so there was no need to 
interpret any more of the language in Roberts. 
The second time the Court considered the unavailability 
rule of Roberts came in White v. Illinois.102  In White, the 
evidence of a sexual assault included three statements by the 
victim at the scene that were admitted under the exception for 
a spontaneous declaration and statements by the victim at the 
hospital that were admitted under the medical examination 
exception.103  The victim did not testify, but the trial judge was 
not asked to find that the victim was unavailable.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the confrontation 
issue, so it assumed that the evidence fit each hearsay 
exception.104  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist rejected the defense assertion that Roberts required 
the prosecution to show the declarant was unavailable.  He 
repeated the analysis from Inadi that had limited the authority 
of Roberts on unavailability to cases involving prior 
testimony.105  The Chief Justice then concluded that there was 
no reason apart from Roberts to require that the declarant be 
unavailable if a prior statement was admitted under an 
established hearsay exception.106  The result in White confirmed 
the statement in Inadi that the Court would not apply Justice 
Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts to every confrontation 
issue. 
2. A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception 
Justice Blackmun’s rule about a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception was not rejected in later Court cases in the same way 
as his rule about unavailability, but it was not consistently 
  
 101 Id. at 402-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 102 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
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 105 Id. at 353-54. 
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applied either.  In Bourjaily v. United States the prosecution 
had used recorded co-conspirator statements by the defendant’s 
accomplice to an FBI agent.107  The accomplice did not testify.108  
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded 
that the recording was admissible.109  He cited Inadi as having 
held that the unavailability rule in Roberts did not apply to a 
co-conspirator statement and described Roberts as “only ‘a 
general approach.’”110  Then he rejected the argument that the 
trial judge should have screened the statements for reliability 
using a quotation from Roberts that stated that an independent 
inquiry into reliability is not required if the hearsay exception 
is firmly rooted.111  He did not define the category of firmly 
rooted exceptions.  Instead, he demonstrated that the Court 
had long considered co-conspirator statements as not being 
excluded by the hearsay rule.112  The Chief Justice never 
directly discussed why co-conspirator statements were not 
excluded by the Confrontation Clause.  In his opinion he 
assumed that to be the rule and ended the discussion after 
explaining why Roberts had not altered the continued validity 
of that rule.113 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also discussed firmly rooted 
hearsay exceptions in his opinion for the Court in White v. 
Illinois, but he did not consider how the term might have been 
defined in Roberts.114  The issue in White was whether the trial 
judge had to find that the declarant was unavailable before the 
prosecution could introduce a spontaneous statement or a 
statement for medical diagnosis.115  The Chief Justice rejected 
the defense argument that Roberts required unavailability; he 
said that issue had been settled by Inadi’s limitation of Roberts 
to its particular facts.116  In discussing the reasons apart from 
Roberts why unavailability should not be required, the Chief 
Justice described firmly rooted exceptions as having sufficient 
indicia of reliability.117  That supported his conclusion that the 
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Confrontation Clause did not require unavailability because 
such a requirement would exclude statements with substantial 
probative value.118 
White never proposed that the trial judge would test any 
specific statement for indicia of reliability.  The Chief Justice 
instead described indicia of reliability as sufficient for any 
statement that fit the two firmly rooted exceptions considered 
in White.119  This discussion of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions 
does not lead to the individualized judicial screening of 
reliability that Justice Scalia rejected in Crawford.  The Chief 
Justice referred only to the weight the context of any excited 
statement might have for the trier of fact and the guarantees of 
credibility for any statement for medical treatment that might 
be considered by the trier of fact.120 
3. Particularized Guarantees of Trustworthiness 
The Court’s treatment of the third rule in Justice 
Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts falls in the middle 
between its rejection of his rule on availability and its favorable 
references to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.  The Supreme 
Court never found that any statement had particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness that would allow the hearsay to 
be admitted without confrontation, but two different Justices 
created the appearance that there are such statements by 
using that part of Roberts to organize the majority decision in 
two separate cases.  In both Lee v. Illinois121 and Idaho v. 
Wright122 the Court rejected arguments by state prosecutors 
that the particular statement in each case could be used 
because it was reliable hearsay, but the Court did not 
completely negate the possibility that other facts might lead to 
a different result.  The Court as well did not reject the idea 
that the right of confrontation could be overcome by showing 
that a statement was reliable. 
In Lee v. Illinois, the defendant’s conviction was based 
in part on the confession of an accomplice who did not testify.123  
As a result, the defendant never had a chance to cross-examine 
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the accomplice.  In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan 
quoted the statement in Roberts that the purpose of the Clause 
is to augment accuracy “by ensuring the defendant an effective 
means to test adverse evidence.”124  In dissent, Justice 
Blackmun quoted language that had first been used in 
California v. Green when he declared that the mission of the 
Clause is to assure that “the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory 
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement”;125 that 
statement used the same language he had quoted in Roberts.126  
Neither Justice, however, gave those terms any further 
mention.  Both opinions discussed only whether the accomplice 
statement was reliable.  Justice Brennan rejected the State’s 
argument that the accomplice statement was factually 
interlocking with the defendant’s own statement; for that 
reason he found that using the statement violated the 
defendant’s right of confrontation.127  He did not discuss 
whether the defendant would have had an opportunity to test 
the statement.  Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s argument that 
the accomplice statement was reliable did not discuss whether 
the factfinder would have a basis for evaluating its truth. 
The debate between the majority and dissent in Lee 
appeared to be framed around the assumption that the 
prosecution could use an accomplice statement if it were 
sufficiently reliable, even though the defendant never had an 
opportunity to examine the declarant.  As Justice Scalia noted 
in Crawford, the Court’s reversal of the state decision in Lee 
meant that the Court did not hold that reliability alone would 
suffice.128 
The first reference to Lee in a Supreme Court opinion 
came in New Mexico v. Earnest.129  As in Lee, the conviction in 
Earnest was based on a confession of an accomplice the 
defendant did not cross-examine.130  In a Per Curiam opinion, 
the Court vacated the state judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with Lee.131  Then-Justice 
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Rehnquist gave more guidance in a concurring opinion that 
described Lee as establishing that an opportunity for cross-
examination was not always required.132  He described Lee as 
setting out a test for determining the admissibility of a 
codefendant’s confession that is factually interlocking with the 
defendant’s own confession.133  In his brief opinion he did not 
describe Lee as having established that the test was a general 
standard of reliability.  Whether or not Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence in Earnest was an accurate summary of the 
meaning of Lee, that interpretation was not presented in 
Crawford.  Both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
agreed that the statement in Crawford was inadmissible 
without mentioning Earnest. 
Justice Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts 
appeared again in Idaho v. Wright.134  In Wright, the hearsay 
statements were made by a two-and-a-half-year-old victim two 
days after the victim’s older sister had reported sexual abuse in 
the family.135  The declarant made the statements to an 
examining pediatrician after police and welfare officials took 
her into custody.136  The trial court admitted the hearsay under 
the state’s residual hearsay exception.137  The Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed after finding that the hearsay did not fit any 
traditional hearsay exception and that it lacked particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.138  In the United States 
Supreme Court, the State argued that the totality of 
circumstances provided particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness; the State relied on both the circumstances of 
how the statement was made and other evidence that 
corroborated the truth of the statement.139 
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Wright 
that affirmed the conclusion of the state court that admitting 
the victim’s statement violated the right of confrontation.  
Justice O’Connor, however, did not endorse the reasoning of 
the state court that the constitutional flaw was the lack of 
procedural safeguards.140  She rejected the argument of the 
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prosecution that the statement could be used if other evidence 
corroborated the truth of the statement.141  She did accept the 
argument that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 
could be factors that “relate to whether the child declarant was 
particularly likely to be telling the truth.”142  She amplified the 
focus on whether the statement was truthful by describing 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness as “relevant 
circumstances . . . that surround the making of the statement 
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.”143  
Although Justice O’Connor did not say that her opinion 
in Wright was intended to replace Roberts, she did discuss the 
reliability of the statement in a way that appeared to go beyond 
Roberts.  Justice O’Connor defined the issue as whether the 
statement had “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”144  She defined proper guarantees as ones 
that surround the making of the statement, and she rejected 
any use of corroboration of the facts by other evidence.145  The 
common theme that tied her discussion together was 
reliability.  Justice O’Connor applied these tests and found that 
only two of the factors stated by the trial court related to the 
circumstances of the making of the statement – whether a two-
and-a-half-year-old child would have a motive to make up such 
a story of sexual assault and whether one would expect a child 
of that age to fabricate a statement about sexual abuse.146  
Those two factors were not enough to allow the statement to be 
used.  It is possible to conclude from Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
that the child’s statement could have been used if there had 
been more facts supporting admissibility, but that is only one 
possible inference from Justice O’Connor’s analysis. 
None of the Justices in Wright disagreed with Justice 
O’Connor’s focus on the reliability of the hearsay.  The 
dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy accepted Justice 
O’Connor’s premise that the issue was whether the hearsay 
was trustworthy.147  Justice Kennedy argued only that the 
Court should not reject corroboration; he thought that judges 
should be able to use corroborating evidence to find that the 
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hearsay was trustworthy.148  Justice Blackmun joined Justice 
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion without comment, so he did not 
discuss whether Justice Kennedy had correctly interpreted 
Roberts. 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia distinguished Lee from the 
possible inferences that could be drawn from Justice Brennan’s 
opinion.149  Justice Scalia could have interpreted Wright in the 
same way in Crawford, but he did not.  Instead, he ignored 
Wright completely.  Justice Scalia had joined Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Wright but he did not mention 
Wright even though he otherwise listed all the Court’s 
confrontation cases as generally faithful to the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.150 
A careful reading of Wright shows that even the focus on 
reliability in Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not compel the 
conclusion that a hearsay statement could be admitted “upon a 
mere finding of reliability” of the particular declarant’s 
statement.  None of the factors Justice O’Connor said could be 
used required the trial judge to evaluate the trustworthiness or 
reliability of the particular declarant.  Each factor began with 
the undisputed fact that the declarant was two-and-a-half 
years old and then considered the knowledge and reasoning 
capacity of any child of that age.  The factors that did relate to 
the trustworthiness or reliability of the particular declarant 
were those that Wright said could not be used. 
Wright may have had more impact than Roberts in 
creating the appearance that the Confrontation Clause could be 
satisfied by a judicial finding of reliability.  Even Justice Scalia 
described the issue in those terms in 1990.  In Maryland v. 
Craig, announced on the same day as Idaho v. Wright, Justice 
Scalia dissented from the decision to allow a child witness in a 
sexual abuse trial to testify by closed circuit television.151  In 
the course of arguing that the Confrontation Clause should be 
applied literally to require face-to-face confrontation of every 
witness who testified, Justice Scalia discussed the application 
of the Clause to hearsay evidence.152  He described the limits on 
hearsay as necessary to prevent the prosecution from 
subverting the right of confrontation by calling a witness to 
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repeat a hearsay statement.153  Justice Scalia summarized the 
Court’s opinions as “focused upon whether the reliability of the 
hearsay statements (which are not expressly excluded by the 
Confrontation Clause) ‘is otherwise assured.’”154 
Justice Scalia’s summary of confrontation doctrine in 
Craig may not seem accurate after Crawford, but the summary 
was not central to his opinion.  In 1990, no Justice was trying 
to provide a substitute for Roberts.  They had no reason to do so 
because the Court had not been consistently treating Roberts 
as the foundation for confrontation doctrine.  For similar 
reasons, Wright should not be read as a new foundation but 
rather as another instance of the Court developing 
confrontation doctrine on a case-by-case basis.  The result is 
more important than each detail in the discussion.  The holding 
in Wright could have been described in Crawford as not 
inconsistent with Crawford’s interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause, even if the Court no longer endorses all 
the inferences that could be drawn from Wright. 
D. The History of the Testimonial Interpretation 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Maryland v. Craig is 
important for a second reason.  It was the first appearance of a 
key part of what eventually became the testimonial 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford.  There 
was no hearsay issue in Craig because the victim testified; the 
only issue was the use of closed-circuit television.  In her 
majority opinion, Justice O’Connor concluded that a trial judge 
could permit the use of television on a finding of necessity.155  In 
discussing that question, she surveyed both the Court’s 
confrontation cases that had involved hearsay and its 
confrontation cases that had involved trial procedure.156  
Justice O’Connor then concluded from both sets of precedent 
that something less than face-to-face confrontation at trial 
would suffice if “necessary to further an important public policy 
and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise 
assured.”157 
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s 
confrontation cases on the use of hearsay involved a different 
issue from its cases on trial procedure.158  He did not contest 
Justice O’Connor’s summary of the hearsay cases because he 
was making a different point.  He argued that the 
confrontation rules about hearsay were based on a limitation 
that was implicit in the Confrontation Clause.  His point was 
that the requirement of face-to-face confrontation was explicit 
and therefore stronger than the implicit limitation on hearsay.  
Part of his reasoning was that the language of the Sixth 
Amendment gave a defendant the right to be confronted by the 
“witnesses against him,” a phrase Justice Scalia interpreted as 
meaning all those who give testimony at trial.159 
The next step in the evolution of the testimonial 
interpretation came two years later in White v. Illinois160 when 
the United States submitted an Amicus Curiae brief in support 
of the State.161  That brief argued that the Confrontation Clause 
did not impose any limits on the prosecution’s use of the 
particular hearsay in the case – an excited utterance and a 
statement to medical personnel for the purpose of medical 
treatment.162  It cited Justice Scalia’s dissent in Craig for the 
proposition that the Clause applied only to those who provide 
testimony at trial or its functional equivalent and argued that 
neither statement had been made by such a “witness against” 
the defendant.163 
The United States described this interpretation as an 
intermediate position between the two polar readings Justice 
Harlan had described in Green.164  This interpretation did not 
limit the Confrontation Clause to the witnesses who actually 
appear, but it did not extend the Clause to every hearsay 
statement.165  At the heart of this interpretation was a 
definition of the functional equivalent of in-court testimony as 
“affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or other statements 
(such as confessions) that are made with a view to legal 
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proceedings.”166  The United States did not offer this 
interpretation in an effort to expand the protection offered by 
the Confrontation Clause to defendants; its Amicus Brief in 
support of the State of Illinois was an effort to substantially 
reduce the scope of the Clause. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the interpretation 
offered by the United States in his majority opinion in White.  
He described the interpretation as a narrow reading that would 
limit the effect of the Confrontation Clause to ex parte 
affidavits or similar statements “made for the principal 
purpose of accusing or incriminating the defendant.”167  The 
Chief Justice said that the Court would continue on its middle 
course that did not equate hearsay with confrontation even 
though it allowed hearsay within an established exception to be 
used without confrontation.168 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in White, 
joined by Justice Scalia, that also described the interpretation 
offered by the United States as a narrow reading of the 
Confrontation Clause.169  Justice Thomas argued that the 
Court’s analysis of confrontation doctrine under the two 
standards defined in Roberts implied that “the Confrontation 
Clause bars only unreliable hearsay.”170  He suggested 
replacing the distinction between reliable and unreliable 
hearsay with a distinction between testimonial materials and 
all other hearsay.171  Justice Thomas surveyed the history of 
the Sixth Amendment and concluded that it did not seem likely 
that the drafters intended to allow the prosecution to use an ex 
parte affidavit just because it was reliable.172  He did not 
suggest that the Sixth Amendment history provided a single 
definition of testimonial materials.  Instead, he said only that 
“[o]ne possible formulation” was “affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.”173  The hearsay involved in White 
did not fall into any of those categories, so Justice Thomas 
could state that the Court had reached the correct result by 
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allowing the prosecution to use excited utterances and a 
statement for medical diagnosis. 
E. The Prelude in Lilly v. Virginia 
Following White, the Supreme Court took a seven-year 
break from debating confrontation doctrine.  In Lilly v. 
Virginia, the Court considered whether the Confrontation 
Clause permitted the prosecution to use an entire confession of 
an accomplice that contained some statements against penal 
interest and other statements that accused the defendant.174  
The state court had rejected the defendant’s confrontation 
argument after concluding that the statement was a statement 
against penal interest and that the penal interest exception 
was firmly rooted under state law.175  The Supreme Court was 
unanimous that admitting the statement was a confrontation 
violation, but none of the five opinions was supported by a 
majority.  Each opinion suggested a different way of organizing 
confrontation doctrine. 
Justice Stevens organized the analysis in his lead 
opinion around Roberts.176  He began by assuming that the 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment by the accomplice made his 
trial testimony unavailable.177  Justice Stevens described the 
test in Roberts as allowing such a statement if it fit a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception or contained particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.178  On the first test, he stated 
conclusively that an accomplice confession inculpating the 
defendant was not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.179  
If such a statement were to be admitted it could only be under 
the second test, a test that was not met under the facts before 
the Court.180  The analysis by Justice Stevens might have made 
Roberts the foundation of confrontation doctrine, but Justice 
Stevens was not writing for a majority.  The five Justices who 
did not join his opinion made clear that they did not agree with 
his reliance on Roberts. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the second-largest 
grouping of three Justices.181  He did not object to using the two 
Roberts tests, but he did not agree with the application of 
either test by Justice Stevens to the facts before the Court.  
The Chief Justice did not dissent from the holding that the 
state court had permitted the prosecution to use hearsay 
evidence that violated the Confrontation Clause.  His first 
objection was that the Court did not need to categorically 
exclude all accomplice confessions from the category of firmly 
rooted hearsay exceptions.182  His second objection was the 
Court should allow the state courts to review whether the 
confession had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.183  
Both arguments were consistent with a case-by-case approach 
to the development of confrontation doctrine in which the Court 
identifies a particular rule for the specific facts without trying 
to announce a global rule for other facts. 
Three Justices wrote alone.  Justice Scalia wrote a one 
paragraph concurring opinion that described the issue as 
settled under the testimonial interpretation Justice Thomas 
had proposed in his concurring opinion in White.184  His opinion, 
while cryptic, made clear that he did not agree with the effort 
of Justice Stevens to base confrontation doctrine on Roberts 
and that he did not agree with the Chief Justice that the Court 
should continue to define confrontation on a case-by-case 
basis.185  Justice Thomas likewise reiterated the testimonial 
interpretation he had proposed in White.186  His own one-
paragraph opinion showed that he did not endorse the effort of 
Justice Stevens to base confrontation doctrine on Roberts.  
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas also agreed with the 
Chief Justice that the state court should have the first chance 
to decide if the confession had particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.187  Justice Thomas did not discuss whether a 
judge should admit or exclude the statement if it was both 
formalized testimonial material and contained particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
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Justice Breyer gave advance billing to Crawford in his 
concurring opinion by describing the debate as whether the 
Sixth Amendment protects trustworthiness or confrontation.188  
He did not take a position on that issue because it was not 
necessary to the unanimous conclusion that there was a 
confrontation violation.  Instead, he simply signaled that at 
least some Justices might be willing to consider other ways to 
interpret the Confrontation Clause. 
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
The Petition for Certiorari in Crawford framed one 
question about the application of the Court’s confrontation 
doctrine to its specific facts and then offered the Court a chance 
to return to the broad question it had left unresolved in Lilly.  
The two questions were: 
I.  Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
permits the admission against a criminal defendant of a custodial 
statement by a potential accomplice on the ground that parts of the 
statement “interlock” with the defendant’s custodial statement. 
II.  Whether this Court should reevaluate Confrontation Clause 
framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and 
hold that the Clause unequivocally prohibits the admission of out-of-
court statements insofar as they are contained in “testimonial” 
materials, such as tape-recorded custodial statement.189 
The Court granted certiorari on both questions.190  While 
both Justice Scalia’s opinion and the examination of Crawford 
have focused primarily on the second question, there are 
lessons that can be learned from the Court’s specific answer to 
the first one as well.  This Part will review the analysis of both 
questions in Crawford, take notice of the lack of debate about 
Roberts in Crawford, and consider whether Crawford 
accurately summarized the confrontation doctrine the Court 
had already established. 
A. The Testimonial Interpretation 
The defendant in Crawford was convicted of assault by 
a jury that heard the custodial statements of both the 
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defendant and his wife.191  The defendant did not deny stabbing 
the victim, but he did claim self-defense.  That defense had 
some support from the account in the defendant’s custodial 
statement that “I could a swore I seen [the victim] goin’ for 
somethin’ before . . . .”192  His self-defense claim was undercut 
by his wife’s custodial statement in which she responded to a 
question about whether the victim had anything in his hands 
before the stabbing by saying: “A. (pausing) um um (no).”193  
The defendant’s wife did not testify because of the state marital 
privilege, so the State offered the tape recording of her 
statement.194  The State argued it was a statement against her 
penal interest because she admitted she had led the defendant 
to the victim’s apartment and facilitated the assault.195  The 
trial judge admitted the statement after finding it had 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the test in 
Roberts.196 
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction.197  It concluded that his wife’s entire statement was 
inadmissible because parts were self-exculpatory198 and the 
parts that were against her penal interest were not sufficiently 
reliable to satisfy either the state hearsay rule or the right of 
confrontation.199  The Court of Appeals relied on Lilly200 and the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal 
penal interest exception in Williamson v. United States.201  It 
distinguished Lee202 because the statements of the defendant 
and his wife were dissimilar on whether the victim had 
something in his hand when he was stabbed. 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals and reinstated Crawford’s conviction.203  It concluded 
that the statements of the defendant and his wife were 
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interlocking and virtually identical.204  It turned the 
discrepancies between their stories about whether and when 
the victim had a weapon into a point of similarity by describing 
both statements as “ambiguous as to whether [the victim] ever 
actually possessed a weapon.”205  The Washington Supreme 
Court based its analysis on its 1993 decision in State v. Rice,206 
in which it had followed the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lee v. Illinois.207  It did not discuss whether Lee was 
still a good precedent on the validity of the interlocking 
confession theory and it never mentioned Lilly v. Virginia.208 
The facts of Crawford did not require reevaluating 
confrontation doctrine to identify the errors of the Washington 
Supreme Court.  On the facts relevant to self defense, the two 
statements did not interlock as much as the confessions in Lee.  
The Supreme Court had effectively supplanted Lee in Idaho v. 
Wright209 when it rejected factual corroboration as a means to 
establish reliability.210  The interlocking confession theory was 
not mentioned by any Justice in Lilly and had all but 
disappeared from other appellate decisions in recent years.  In 
fact, it had been the grounds in only one unpublished appellate 
opinion and had been mentioned in only three other appellate 
opinions.211  The language from Lee cited by the Washington 
Supreme Court was not part of the holding because the 
conviction in Lee had been reversed.  Lee had been cited in the 
concurring opinion in Earnest,212 but no Supreme Court opinion 
had ever affirmed a conviction on the basis of the interlocking 
confession theory.  Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his 
concurring opinion in Crawford by stating that it would have 
been sufficient to cite Wright as grounds for reversal.213  The 
result in Crawford makes clear that no Justice thought that 
any application of Lee would support admitting the hearsay in 
Crawford; the reversal was unanimous. 
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The narrowest interpretation of Crawford on its specific 
facts made no change at all in the Court’s doctrine.  The Court 
reversed the decision of the Washington Supreme Court after 
holding that the statement of the defendant’s wife could not be 
used unless she testified and was subject to cross-examination 
at trial.  Justice Scalia’s suggestion that her statement could 
have been used if she had testified at trial214 went beyond the 
facts but it was consistent with cases such as Green.215  He also 
suggested that her testimony could have been used if she had 
testified at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had 
cross-examined her.216  That suggestion also went beyond the 
facts, but it was consistent with the Court’s decisions in 
Green217 and Roberts.218  Justice Scalia stated that there were no 
facts that would suffice to establish that the particular 
statement had indicia of reliability,219 but that statement did 
not undercut any Supreme Court decision. 
Justice Scalia did not discuss how and why the 
Washington Supreme Court reached its interpretation that a 
confrontation objection required a judicial evaluation of the 
reliability of the statement.  He did not discuss whether 
Roberts had instructed judges to screen each statement to 
determine its reliability.  He did not discuss whether other 
courts were misreading Roberts, reading Roberts correctly but 
extending it incorrectly beyond its facts, or reading and 
extending Roberts correctly in ways that eventually showed 
where Roberts was flawed as a foundation.  Those questions 
might not have been important because the state court decision 
was wrong in any event.  Those questions, however, can be very 
important in deciding how to define an accurate interpretation 
of the Confrontation Clause that other courts can and will 
apply correctly. 
Justice Scalia did explain why the Washington trial 
court had erred by allowing the prosecution to use a hearsay 
statement after evaluating it for reliability instead of asking 
whether the defendant had a chance to cross-examine the 
declarant.  From his review of the historical record, Justice 
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Scalia identified two propositions.  First, he described the 
Confrontation Clause as intended to prevent the prosecution 
from routinely using confessions and statements to 
investigating magistrates by declarants who did not testify at 
trial.220  Second, he concluded that such statements could be 
used only if the declarant was unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.221 
Justice Scalia described the prior opportunity for cross-
examination as a necessary condition for introducing the 
statement, not just a sufficient condition.222  Establishing that 
the prior opportunity to cross-examine was a necessary 
condition meant that there could not be any alternatives or 
substitutes.  It meant that the reliability of the statement could 
not be the equivalent of cross-examination and that judicial 
evaluation of the reliability of a statement could not be a 
substitute for the right of confrontation.  That conclusion was 
also implicitly supported by Justice Scalia’s historical review 
because none of the evidence he presented suggested that 
reliability was the proper test.  Chief Justice Rehnquist did not 
contest that issue in his concurrence.  He did not agree that the 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay 
had been as important as it was described by Justice Scalia, 
but the Chief Justice did not argue that reliability had been 
considered an alternative test to cross-examination.223 
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the scope of his 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was framed in the 
same terms as the dilemma described by Justice Harlan in 
Green and by Justice Blackmun in Roberts.224  Justice Scalia 
suggested the Clause could provide a right to confront only 
those who testify at trial, a right to confront every person 
whose statement is offered at trial, or a right somewhere in 
between.225  He rejected both polar interpretations, as had 
Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun, and then adopted an in-
between interpretation the Court had not previously endorsed. 
Justice Scalia rejected the narrowest coverage of the 
Clause because it was contrary to an inference he drew from its 
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history.226  He described the history of confrontation as a 
political and legal concept that was at least as old as Roman 
times.  He described the history of the Confrontation Clause as 
showing that it was directed at the use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence for the prosecution.227  Therefore, the 
Clause must do more than guarantee a right to cross-examine 
those who testify at trial because it was not intended to leave 
the admissibility of all out-of-court statements to the law of 
evidence. 
Justice Scalia also rejected the broadest coverage of the 
Clause that would make it applicable to all out-of-court 
statements by declaring that some hearsay was outside the 
core concerns of the Sixth Amendment.228  He described those 
statements most clearly covered by the Confrontation Clause 
as “testimonial.”  Justice Scalia acknowledged that he had not 
provided a comprehensive definition of that label, but he said 
that at a minimum a statement was testimonial if it was made 
in police interrogation or in testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial.229 
Justice Scalia reviewed the Court’s confrontation 
decisions to demonstrate that their results were consistent 
with his testimonial interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause.230  The Court had allowed the prosecution to use prior 
testimony of an unavailable witness who had been cross-
examined.  It had not allowed the prosecution to use prior 
testimony of a witness who was not unavailable or the prior 
testimony of a witness the defendant had no opportunity to 
cross-examine.  He emphasized that the Court had excluded 
prosecution use of accomplice confessions that were testimonial 
in Lilly and Lee, and reconciled the approval of the admission 
of the accomplice statement in Dutton by describing it as not 
testimonial.231  He asserted that other than one minor and 
arguable exception in White, the Court had never accepted 
anything other than a prior opportunity for cross-examination 
as sufficient to allow the prosecution to use a testimonial 
statement.232  Justice Scalia did not examine how his 
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suggestion that confrontation analysis had been going in the 
wrong direction for twenty-four years since Roberts could be 
consistent with his conclusion that the Court had been 
reaching correct results during those same years. 
At first, the statement in Crawford that confrontation 
alone will allow the prosecution to use a testimonial statement 
may appear to be a bright-line rule because the rule as stated 
allows no exceptions or balancing.  In another sense, however, 
the statement in Crawford is only another balancing test, with 
the balancing now being carried out in deciding whether any 
statement should be labeled testimonial.  The emphasis on the 
historical record in Crawford may suggest that it is a balancing 
test controlled by history and therefore a balance that does not 
consider present-day factors.  Whether and how the Court 
applies Crawford in future cases may depend on how well this 
balancing test accords with the historical record and whether it 
provides a workable foundation for confrontation doctrine 
B. The Missing Debate in Crawford 
The opinions in Crawford involve only the appearance of 
a debate about Roberts.  Justice Scalia identified the Roberts 
test as reducing the right of confrontation to a question of 
reliability.  He targeted the “unpardonable vice of the Roberts 
test,”233 “Roberts’ failings,”234 and “Roberts’ unpredictable and 
inconsistent application.”235  He said “the Roberts test is 
inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.”236  The 
Chief Justice began his opinion in Crawford as a “dissent from 
the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts”237 and conceded 
that “the Court of course overrules Ohio v. Roberts.”238 
Despite the references to Roberts, Crawford was not a 
debate about the holding in Roberts or the Court’s application 
of the Roberts test.  Justice Scalia specifically included Roberts 
when he described the holdings of the Supreme Court cases 
that were “largely consistent” with the two propositions he 
derived from the historical record.239  Justice Scalia did not 
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identify any case in which the Supreme Court had reached the 
wrong result by applying the Roberts test.  Even his footnote 
questioning the implications of White v. Illinois for issues the 
Court had not specifically addressed in that case did not assign 
any blame to reliance on the Roberts test.240  The Chief Justice 
argued that the Court should not change course, but he did not 
defend the Roberts test nor describe the Roberts test as the 
course the Supreme Court should continue to follow. 
In Crawford, the Justices were debating whether and 
how the Court should describe an overall theory of 
confrontation.  On the issue of whether the Court should do 
that, Justice Scalia was following the lead of Justice Blackmun 
in Roberts.  Roberts was the first and only other time the Court 
had proposed an overall theory of confrontation.  On the issue 
of how to do that, Justice Scalia described a theory that was 
quite different from the one Justice Blackmun proposed in 
Roberts.   Nevertheless, Justice Scalia followed the lead of 
Justice Blackmun and Justice Harlan before him by assuming 
that an overall theory of confrontation should identify the 
kinds of hearsay excluded by the right of confrontation.  In 
contrast, on the issue of whether to describe an overall theory, 
the Chief Justice rejected the approach of Justice Scalia as well 
as that of Justice Blackmun; he argued that the Court should 
not describe an overall theory of confrontation of any kind.  The 
course the Chief Justice wanted the Court to continue following 
was a case-by-case development of confrontation doctrine by 
addressing the facts of each case. 
C. Pre-Crawford Confrontation Doctrine after Crawford 
Justice Scalia illustrated some implications of the 
testimonial interpretation with brief descriptions of the 
confrontation rules addressed in the Court’s pre-Crawford 
cases.  His endorsement of the results in those cases means 
that the rules they established should still be viable after 
Crawford.  His summaries of those rules, however, require 
careful attention to nuances in the prior cases. 
1. Dying Declaration 
Justice Scalia did not contest that a dying declaration 
could be used without confrontation, in part because the 
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Supreme Court had recognized the dying declaration in 
Mattox.241  He went on to concede that even a testimonial dying 
declaration might be admissible without confrontation.242  For 
that conclusion he cited English common law decisions and an 
English treatise.243  He suggested that this would be the only 
exception for a testimonial statement because it is sui generis 
in the English common law.244  Justice Scalia’s assumption that 
the scope of any exception should be defined by English 
common law may explain why he did not include a caution that 
the discussion of the dying declaration exception in Mattox was 
dictum.  It may also explain why he did not mention that the 
Court could still consider further limitations or qualifications 
for dying declarations, as he did when he suggested that 
spontaneous declarations might have to be made immediately.  
Crawford may suggest that any statement is admissible if it 
can be labeled a dying declaration, but there is still no case in 
which the Supreme Court has affirmed a conviction on that 
basis. 
2. Forfeiture 
Justice Scalia also endorsed a second exception to the 
bright-line rule for testimonial statements when he stated that 
“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds.”245  For this proposition, Justice Scalia used a “See” 
signal and cited Reynolds v. United States.246   There are many 
questions about the forfeiture doctrine that were not discussed 
in this brief mention in Crawford.  Justice Scalia did not 
discuss whether the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment 
had been followed in Reynolds in 1879.  He did not suggest any 
limits on the rule of forfeiture that might be derived from 
Reynolds, even though elsewhere in Crawford he emphasized 
the need to read the facts of Supreme Court precedent 
precisely. 
Reynolds did not involve an ordinary hearsay 
statement.  The hearsay was prior testimony at an earlier trial 
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of the same defendant under a different indictment.247  The 
defendant had been present and had a full opportunity to cross-
examine.248  There was evidence that the defendant was 
actively involved in preventing the witness from testifying.  
That involvement was continuous and ongoing at the time the 
prior testimony was offered.249  The Court found that the 
prosecution had made an adequate showing that the witness 
was not available.250  The Supreme Court cited two English 
cases that had allowed the prosecution to use prior testimony – 
an examination and a deposition – in both of which the 
defendant had kept the witness away.251  The Supreme Court 
cited two state cases as holding the same without discussing 
their facts.252  It then cited three American treatises as support 
for its statement that “if a witness is kept away by the adverse 
party, his testimony, taken on a former trial between the same 
parties upon the same issues, may be given in evidence.”253 
Reynolds did not consider whether the forfeiture rule 
would apply if the defendant had killed the witness as part of 
the original crime without specifically intending to make the 
witness an unavailable hearsay declarant.  That is a different 
kind of wrongdoing because its effect cannot be undone at the 
time of trial, while in Reynolds the defendant could have 
changed his mind and permitted the witness to attend and 
testify.  Reynolds did not consider whether the defendant’s 
wrongdoing would have mattered if the hearsay had been 
something other than prior testimony at a trial in which the 
defendant had already had one chance to confront the 
declarant. 
In criticizing the reliability test, Justice Scalia wrote 
that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because 
a defendant is obviously guilty.”254  That criticism could apply 
as well to some versions of a forfeiture rule.  Should forfeiture 
depend on no more than a judicial finding that a defendant’s 
alleged commission of the crime contributed to the 
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unavailability of live testimony?  That possibility would raise 
the question of whether dispensing with confrontation because 
the judge thinks the defendant is obviously guilty is akin to 
dispensing with the jury verdict because the defendant is 
obviously guilty.  That question was not answered in Reynolds 
or Crawford. 
How much the forfeiture exception is limited to the facts 
of Reynolds may determine how broad the exception becomes, 
but any exception undercuts the possibility that the historical 
interpretation of Crawford will clarify confrontation doctrine 
with a bright-line rule.  At the same time, the endorsement of 
the forfeiture exception without examining how it fits into the 
historical record raises a question about whether the 
testimonial interpretation will provide a stable and coherent 
foundation for confrontation doctrine. 
3. Prior Testimony 
Justice Scalia gave substantial attention to the 
Supreme Court’s precedent on prior testimony.255  He 
summarized the cases that required the government to show 
that the witness was not available to testify at trial, the cases 
that had excluded confessions where the defendant had no 
opportunity to cross-examine, and the cases that allowed prior 
testimony only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine.256  Justice Scalia described Roberts as a case in 
which the defendant had examined the witness and 
emphasized in his discussion of Lee that it was important to 
recognize precisely what the Court actually held.257  In his 
conclusion, however, he summarized the Court’s prior holdings 
too broadly. 
In the text, Justice Scalia stated that “[t]estimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted 
only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”258  By 
listing the prior opportunity to cross-examine as sufficient, 
Justice Scalia went beyond the holdings of the Court’s two 
primary cases:  Green and Roberts.  In Green, Justice White 
had described the witness at the preliminary hearing as 
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“subjected to extensive cross-examination by respondent’s 
counsel.”259  In Roberts, Justice Blackmun described how 
“[d]efense counsel questioned [the witness] at some length” at 
the preliminary hearing as “counsel continued to explore the 
underlying events in detail.”260 
Justice Blackmun stated that the state court opinion in 
Roberts had raised the issue of whether Green had suggested 
that “the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered the prior 
testimony admissible.”261  He explicitly said the Court “need not 
decide” whether that was correct.262  He further said that the 
Court need not “decide whether de minimis questioning is 
sufficient.”263  No matter how much the general theory in 
Roberts might be rejected, Justice Blackmun limited the scope 
of its specific holding by reserving this issue.  Crawford does 
not establish that the Court has accepted that a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine is sufficient.  In addition, 
expanding the rule to allow the prosecution to use former 
testimony on no more than a prior opportunity to cross-
examine or de minimis questioning raises an issue that was not 
subject to historical analysis in Crawford. 
4. Trial Confrontation 
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s statement that a testimonial 
statement can be used if “the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial” suggests that the appearance will 
suffice.264  This statement was supported by a citation to page 
162 in Part II of Green,265 with no mention that in Part IV of 
Green the Supreme Court remanded the case for further 
factfinding because a mere appearance by the declarant was 
not enough.266  In Green, Justice White stated that the 
application of the rule in a typical case would be proper 
because the witness at trial would give a different version of 
the facts from the prior statement and be subject to cross-
examination with respect to both versions.267  In Green, the 
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declarant’s presence with an apparent lapse of memory might 
have affected the right to cross-examine in a way that would 
create a confrontation problem, so the Court framed the 
question on remand as whether there was sufficient cross-
examination at trial.268 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia may have come closer to 
describing the limits imposed by part IV of Green when he said 
that a statement could be used “so long as the declarant is 
present at trial to defend or explain it.”269  However, that 
language still focuses on presence and ability to act without 
requiring that the record show the declarant actually did 
defend or explain the statement.  The requirement of an actual 
examination is a detail that can be easily overlooked by an 
attorney or judge who assumes that the latest Supreme Court 
mention of a topic provides a complete statement of every rule.  
Since this is also a detail that has not been examined under the 
testimonial theory of Crawford, it remains another reason to be 
hesitant about whether Crawford has provided a complete 
foundation for confrontation doctrine. 
5. Business Records 
Justice Scalia declared that statements within other 
common law hearsay exceptions, such as business records, 
were not testimonial.270  The Chief Justice approved of that 
exception and expanded it to include business records and 
official records.271  Neither opinion mentioned that the Court 
has never directly addressed the confrontation issues raised by 
the hearsay exception for business records or official records.  
Even if the common ground in the two opinions creates the 
appearance that the Court will probably not require 
confrontation for every business record or official record, that 
does not necessarily mean that every application of those labels 
will be sufficient to overcome a confrontation objection.  The 
Court has not yet examined whether the historical record 
supports the classification of every business record as a 
nontestimonial statement. 
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III. LEARNING MORE FROM THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
Justice Scalia used the historical record in Crawford to 
address two related but different questions about confrontation 
doctrine.  The first question asked whether admitting a 
statement on the basis of a judicial evaluation that it was 
reliable was consistent with the best interpretation of the 
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  On that question, 
Crawford made clear that a judicial finding of reliability was 
not sufficient to overcome the textual requirement that a 
defendant have the right to confront the witnesses.272  Unless 
that reading of history can be challenged in some way with new 
evidence, Crawford appears to have made a permanent 
alteration to the direction in which confrontation doctrine had 
been moving. 
The second question asked whether the historical record 
could be used to create a workable test that would exclude all 
improper hearsay statements but permit the prosecution to use 
evidence that does not violate the right of confrontation.  The 
proposal in Crawford that the distinction should be whether 
the statement is testimonial is an interpretation of the 
historical record that can be examined on several points.  This 
Part will consider whether there might be alternative 
conclusions about the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause.  It will describe what the ratification history shows 
about the original meaning, discuss the dangers of reading the 
historical record from a modern perspective, and examine the 
roots of Crawford in the history of the Supreme Court’s search 
for confrontation doctrine. 
A. The Ratification Debates as a Source for the Original 
Meaning 
Justice Scalia did not survey the history of confrontation 
in an unbroken sweep from Roman times to today.  Instead, his 
history consists of specific points organized chronologically 
without being necessarily connected.  That may be the only 
way to present so much history within a single Court opinion, 
but it leaves open the possibility that the Framers’ generation 
did not know all the historical evidence that can now be 
assembled and may have interpreted it differently from the 
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way it is interpreted today.  Presenting the history 
chronologically can also suggest a causation relation that may 
not necessarily be accurate. 
Some of these questions are raised by Justice Scalia’s 
discussion of the confrontation history in the 16th and 17th 
centuries in England and in the Colonies.273  For England, he 
discussed the well-known prosecution of Lord Raleigh on the 
basis of a confession by a witness who was examined before 
Privy Council.274  He gave more emphasis to the caselaw 
concerning examinations of suspects and witnesses by justices 
of the peace under statutes of Queen Mary’s reign.275  When he 
turned to the Colonies his examples were different.  The 
controversial examination practices he described were the use 
of gubernatorial commissions to examine witnesses in Virginia 
and the enforcement of the Stamp Act in the admiralty courts 
in Massachusetts.276  Justice Scalia then listed the Colonial 
declarations of rights adopted around the time of the 
Revolution without discussing whether they were a response to 
the Marian statutes he had emphasized or a response to the 
Colonial experience.  There may have been a major difference.  
One study of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause 
describes the colonial use of the Marian statutes by 
magistrates to control the lower classes as unobjectionable to 
the upper classes who protested the expanded jurisdiction of 
the admiralty courts to punish smuggling.277 
Justice Scalia used even fewer sources for the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment when he reached the time of 
the Constitution.  He cited only two sources from the 
ratification history.  Each quotation confirmed that the 
founding-era rhetoric decried the omission of a right of 
confrontation from the proposed Constitution, but it is hard to 
find any details about that right in either quotation.  It is also 
hard to know how much significance to attribute to silence 
about nontestimonial hearsay without knowing whether the 
speaker was a lawyer who might have known about the details 
of evidence law in a criminal case. 
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The first person Justice Scalia quoted was Abraham 
Holmes of Massachusetts, a delegate to the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention: 
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; . . . whether [the 
defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the 
advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told . . . .  [W]e shall 
find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to institute 
judicatories little less auspicious than a certain tribunal in 
Spain, . . . the Inquisition.278 
Secondary sources have described Abraham Holmes as 
someone who was self-educated in the law and the president of 
a local court of sessions,279 but that description does not fit Mr. 
Holmes in 1788.  His unpublished autobiography makes clear 
that his minor judicial career began several years later and 
that he gave up his judicial career when he was finally 
admitted to practice law.280  By 1788, he had done no more than 
begin to read a few law books; none of them concerned criminal 
law, criminal procedure, or evidence.  His autobiography does 
not mention any experience in a criminal trial before he spoke 
about confrontation in 1788. 
The second person Justice Scalia quoted was an 
anonymous Antifederalist who used the name Federal Farmer 
in a published essay: 
Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of] 
witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in 
question . . . .  [W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be 
frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper 
discovery of truth.281 
Justice Scalia identified Federal Farmer as R. Lee.282  
That attribution is in accord with one possibility that Federal 
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Farmer was Richard Henry Lee,283 a Virginia politician who 
was not a lawyer and had, at most, one year of  judicial 
experience as a justice of the peace over thirty years earlier.284  
Other scholars have identified Federal Farmer as the merchant 
Melancton Smith of New York, again not a lawyer or judge.285 
There are other sources in the ratification debates 
Justice Scalia might have quoted, but those sources likewise 
cannot be confirmed to have been lawyers or judges.  For 
example, Brutus was another anonymous Antifederalist writer 
who also wrote about confrontation.286  Brutus has often been 
identified as Robert Yates, a New York judge at the time, but 
the literature suggests other potential identities who were not 
lawyers.287  The doubts that any statements about 
confrontation in the ratification debates were made by a judge 
or lawyer has to raise a question about whether any quotation 
is a reliable commentary on the rules of evidence. 
On the critical question of evidence about the meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment itself, Justice Scalia included only a 
single sentence that “[t]he First Congress responded by 
including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became 
the Sixth Amendment.”288  Justice Scalia did not mention 
James Madison, considered the actual author of the Sixth 
Amendment, but it does not appear that Madison left any 
useful clues about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  
The First Congress changed the wording in the proposed 
Amendment from “accusers and witnesses” to just “witnesses” 
without leaving any useful legislative history,289 so there is no 
way to know whether that change is significant to the search 
for the original meaning.  That does not mean that there are no 
other clues to what might have been the original meaning of 
the words used in the Confrontation Clause.  One clue requires 
considering the context in which the objections about 
confrontation were raised. 
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The inquiry about the context of the objections can 
begin with Abraham Holmes, the speaker Justice Scalia quoted 
from the ratification debates.  Mr. Holmes was one of 364 
delegates to the Massachusetts ratification convention.290  
Many representatives listed on the delegate roster have titles 
of Honorable, Reverend, Esquire, or a military rank, but 
Abraham Holmes was one of many whose only title was 
Mister.291  The few lines from his speech quoted by Justice 
Scalia are only a small fraction of Mr. Holmes’s entire speech.  
Mr. Holmes did not limit his speech to the two objections to the 
Constitution quoted in Crawford:  that the Constitution did not 
establish a right to confront witnesses and that it did not 
guarantee a defendant the advantage of cross-examination.  In 
his speech, Mr. Holmes also objected to at least fifteen other 
omissions from the Constitution.292  The topics ranged from 
some covered later by the Bill of Rights, such as the lack of 
protection against compelled self-incrimination,293 to the less 
serious, such as not providing for the frequency of court 
sessions.294  There were other complaints about rights that are 
still not recognized, such as compensating acquitted defendants 
for their loss of liberty and loss of time.295 
The same description provides the context for Federal 
Farmer, the second quotation in Crawford from the ratification 
debates.  Federal Farmer’s list of objections was almost as long 
as that of Mr. Holmes, with at least nine of them addressing 
the evils that would arise from the Constitution plus six more 
arguing for other rights that should be protected by a bill of 
rights.296 
Justice Scalia made a traditional argument by using the 
ratification history as a surrogate for legislative history.  He 
did not, however, appear to recognize that this approach may 
warp the ratification history so far out of context that it 
becomes misleading.  This approach has the effect of re-casting 
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the Antifederalists as the defenders of confrontation; it 
implicitly assumes that the Federalists played an opposing role 
as the enemies of confrontation.  Of course, the Federalists 
were the opponents of the Antifederalists, but it was not on the 
subject of confrontation.  No one has ever presented any 
evidence that the opposing sides actually debated the meaning 
of confrontation in the way the terms of a modern statute 
might be debated or negotiated.  The Federalists had no 
apparent interest in taking the other side on many objections 
raised by the Antifederalists; they certainly showed no interest 
in restricting a defendant’s right to confront prosecution 
witnesses.  The full speech of Abraham Holmes and the full 
text of Federal Farmer presented reasons to reject the 
Constitution.  They were Antifederalist statements and should 
be read as only that. 
The ratification debates show both that the right of 
confrontation was being debated by nonlawyers and that no 
one objected that an issue involving the details of a criminal 
trial was being debated by nonlawyers.  That means there is no 
evidence that anyone thought the debate was about the precise 
scope of the right of confrontation or the elements of any 
hearsay exceptions the courts should recognize.  The context of 
the ratification debates suggests that the original meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause must be sought on a different level.  
Instead of the level of technical detail that might have been of 
interest to lawyers and meaningful to judges, both Abraham 
Holmes and Federal Farmer were speaking about broader 
political theory in arguing that the plan of the Constitution 
should not be accepted without some protection for the right of 
confrontation.  Whether or not they were competent to speak 
about the working details of confrontation, they made no effort 
to do so. 
Equally important is that the full content of the speech 
of Abraham Holmes and the letter of Federal Farmer show that 
they were not trying to catalogue all the details of the right of 
confrontation that would not be protected without 
constitutional protection.  They were also not debating English 
common law.  They were making political arguments about 
broad theory.  Their omission of all the permutations cannot be 
taken as any evidence that they did not also care about what 
they did not mention.  They were not responding to a demand 
for a bill of particulars on the question of confrontation alone.  
Nor were they trying to provide guidance for applying the 
Confrontation Clause that had not yet been drafted. 
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B. The Risks of a Modern Perspective 
The outpouring of research on confrontation since 
Justice Harlan lamented the scarcity of sources in Green has 
shown how much English and American criminal procedure 
and evidence rules were evolving before 1791 and how much 
the American hearsay rule evolved after 1791.  In Green, 
Justice Harlan framed his question as whether the Sixth 
Amendment had constitutionalized the hearsay rule.297  Justice 
Blackmun began his general theory in Roberts by considering 
the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the 
hearsay rule.298  Each Justice assumed that they could find 
guidance for a modern question in the historical record even 
though the modern question may never have been considered 
in the earlier era. 
It might appear that Justice Scalia avoided that 
problem in Crawford by seeking the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment at the time it was written.  He appeared to 
insulate the meaning of the Confrontation Clause from being 
misconstrued in modern terms by declaring that it “is most 
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at 
common law, admitting only those exceptions established at 
the time of the founding.”299  While he cited some early state 
cases elsewhere in his opinion, he cited English common law as 
his source for the common law of 1791.300  Justice Scalia and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist debated about English common law.  
English common law may be more accessible or more well-
defined than American common law, but Justice Scalia’s survey 
of the historical record did not provide any evidence that the 
original meaning was tied to English common law.  There is no 
mention of English common law in the statements from the 
ratification debates quoted by Justice Scalia. 
Other explicit text in the Bill of Rights raises questions 
about Justice Scalia’s statement that the Confrontation Clause 
“is most naturally read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law.”301  Justice Scalia immediately 
followed that with “[a]s the English authorities above reveal, 
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the common law in 1791 . . . .”302  Interpreting the text of an 
Amendment as adopting the common law is well-known in 
Seventh Amendment doctrine.  Of course, the Seventh 
Amendment declaration that “the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved”303 is not matched by any text in the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment’s contrast with the 
Seventh Amendment is evidence that the Framers did not use 
language clearly intended to preserve the right of confrontation 
as it then existed in English common law. 
Those doubts about whether Justice Scalia actually 
found the original meaning in Crawford do not necessarily 
undercut the specific holding of the case or even the Court’s 
rejection of the reliability test.  There is equally no mention of a 
judicial reliability test anywhere in the ratification history.  
The doubts raised by the ratification history, however, are 
much more significant to the suggestion in Crawford that the 
original meaning of confrontation was limited to testimonial 
statements. 
It is misleading to rely on hindsight to view evolution as 
a foreordained process.  That caution applies to the evolution of 
the hearsay rule before and after 1791.  From the modern 
perspective, we can observe the evolution of evidence law from 
its unformed structure in 1791 to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  However, it was also possible in 1791 that the 
evolution would go in the opposite direction and the hearsay 
rule would wither and die.  There might be no hearsay rule at 
all today, but there would still be a Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause.  In the same way, other steps and actors 
in the criminal justice system might have evolved in a different 
direction.  For example, the preliminary examination might 
have disappeared if all jurisdictions decided to use indictment 
by a grand jury; that would mean there might be prior 
testimony only for an occasional retrial.  The modern police 
force might not have evolved as a public agency.  An 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause should remain 
consistent and coherent even if there is no hearsay rule, no 
preliminary examination, and no public prosecutor or public 
police department. 
Justice Scalia invoked the text of the Confrontation 
Clause to support his conclusion that its primary or even 
  
 302 Id. 
 303 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
2005] A STABLE FOUNDATION FOR CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE? 85 
exclusive focus was the specific type of out-of-court statement 
he labeled testimonial hearsay.304  He cited Noah Webster’s 
1828 dictionary,305 not exactly a contemporary source for the 
meaning of language used four decades earlier.  The 
implication of his argument is that the word “witnesses” was 
chosen for a purpose, but he did not suggest what word might 
have been used in its place.  All the models available in colonial 
charters used either “witnesses” alone or used both “witnesses” 
and “accusers,”306 but Justice Scalia did not draw any 
conclusions from the omission of “accusers” from the Sixth 
Amendment text.   
Justice Scalia’s use of textual interpretation to buttress 
his testimonial interpretation did not mention the Supreme 
Court cases that have established that the text of the 
Confrontation Clause is applicable to more than questions 
about hearsay.  Some were cases in which he participated.  For 
example, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Coy v. Iowa 
established that the Confrontation Clause can be violated by a 
screen in the courtroom that prevents face-to-face confrontation 
between the defendant and witnesses.307  Justice Scalia 
dissented in Maryland v. Craig308 from Justice O’Connor’s 
conclusion in the majority opinion that a particular closed-
circuit television system did not violate the right of 
confrontation,309 but both Justices agreed that the Clause could 
be violated by the manner in which nonhearsay evidence was 
presented.  In Olden v. Kentucky,310 a Per Curiam opinion 
reversed a state conviction because the trial court’s restrictions 
on the defendant’s cross-examination of a witness did not give 
proper weight to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.311  
Other cases before Justice Scalia joined the Court had 
established that the Clause governs the right to cross-examine 
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a witness312 and the right of a defendant to be present in the 
courtroom to see the witnesses.313 
The right to cross-examine witnesses who testify at trial 
and the right to see and be seen by those witnesses are rights 
based on the text of the Confrontation Clause.  They illustrate 
that its effect is broader than restrictions on hearsay.  As 
Justice Scalia observed in his Craig dissent, these explicit 
rights support an implicit limitation upon hearsay evidence, 
“since otherwise the government could subvert the 
confrontation right by putting on witnesses who know nothing 
except what an absent declarant said.”314  When Justice Scalia 
suggested that the specific words of the Confrontation Clause 
were chosen for the purpose of making a distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay that is not apparent in 
the text, he did not mention the Clause’s nonhearsay effect or 
his own explanation for its effect on hearsay.  An explanation 
for this silence may be found in the Supreme Court’s 
confrontation doctrine history. 
C. The Roots of Crawford’s Testimonial Theory in Prior 
Supreme Court Doctrine 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford can be read as an 
attempt to resolve the dilemma that Justice Harlan defined in 
Green and then could not overcome in Dutton, and that Justice 
Blackmun tried to resolve in Roberts.315  Justice Scalia’s 
approach in Crawford rested on an implicit assumption that 
Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun had focused on the 
wrong word by thinking about “confrontation.”  He proposed 
that clarity requires focusing on the word “witnesses.”316  The 
switch in emphasis had been advocated in academic writings 
before Crawford.317  It produces a newly titled “testimonial” 
theory about the Confrontation Clause. 
The “testimonial” theory may appear to provide the 
overall structure for confrontation doctrine that eluded Justice 
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Harlan and Justice Blackmun.  Dividing all statements into 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay might seem to provide 
a simplified structure for confrontation doctrine that can be 
more readily applied at trial.  The single rule that a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine is the only way to satisfy the 
textual requirement of confrontation provides a bright-line test.  
The testimonial theory may not be supported by any evidence 
from the ratification history, but it is a sufficiently plausible 
interpretation of what the Framers might have meant that 
there is no directly contrary evidence. 
The focus on the word “witnesses” in the Confrontation 
Clause also has the effect of distracting attention from how the 
testimonial interpretation has to be adapted to make it serve as 
a global theory.  Even when it was first advocated by Justice 
Thomas in his concurring opinion in White,318 it was not as self-
contained as it might be made to appear.  Justice Thomas 
suggested the difficulties of trying to define the functional 
equivalent of in-court testimony but he proposed a rule that 
would apply to “formalized testimonial materials,” such as 
testimony.319  Justice Scalia in Crawford followed his appeal to 
the text of the Clause by listing Justice Thomas’s definition of 
the functional equivalent as well as two other possible 
definitions suggested in the Petitioner’s Brief and an Amicus 
Brief.320  The need for such nontextual refinements undercuts 
the appearance that the text of the Clause actually supports 
the testimonial interpretation. 
The presence of the right of confrontation in the Bill of 
Rights is a textual clue that the Framers might have been 
concerned with confrontation.  The absence of any detail in the 
Confrontation Clause is a textual clue that the Framers did not 
think it was necessary to define the details of a hearsay rule.  
Justice Scalia provided a description of a right of confrontation 
that was based on the prevalent assumption that the original 
meaning was about hearsay.  Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Crawford did not, however, examine how the Court might 
interpret the Confrontation Clause if it abandoned that 
assumption and read the original meaning as a statement 
about confrontation. 
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IV. REASONS AND A FOUNDATION FOR REVISING THE 
TESTIMONIAL INTERPRETATION 
The questions that remain after Crawford should not 
obscure the importance of the changes it made.  The decisions 
from federal and state courts since Crawford have brought to 
light a substantial number of interpretations of the 
Confrontation Clause that seem doubtful.  Crawford has 
focused attention on several statutory hearsay exceptions that 
may have gone well beyond what the Supreme Court had ever 
upheld under Roberts or any other precedent. 
The questions that remain after Crawford also do not 
negate the possibility that even an imperfect or incomplete 
theory may be the best theory.  It may be unreasonable to 
expect to find any theory that is fully consistent with the 
historical record, practically useful in the trial courts, and 
sufficiently complete to provide guidance about new questions 
as they arise.  It is always important to ask how serious the 
gaps might be and whether there is an alternative that is 
demonstrably better.  This Part will examine some possible 
gaps in the testimonial theory of Crawford and describe the 
roots of an alternative interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
A. Gaps in the Testimonial Interpretation 
One danger created by Crawford is that the effort to 
base confrontation doctrine so heavily on history appears to 
provide no clear principles for deciding whether a particular 
statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, or for defining the 
confrontation requirements for nontestimonial statements.  
Without a clear principle, it will be difficult to distinguish 
between decisions that apply Crawford properly to facts the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed and those that limit 
Crawford as closely as possible to its specific facts in order to 
minimize any actual effect on prior practice.  For example, 
some courts have suggested that “interrogation” should be 
found only where it is structured and formal, so that less-
structured fact gathering by police officers is outside the 
concern of the Confrontation Clause.321  Child forensic 
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interviewers have been advised to change some of their 
techniques to increase the chances their interviews will be 
labeled nontestimonial and admitted when the child does not 
testify.322  The Supreme Court can control when it might decide 
whether Crawford requires something more than delaying the 
start of police questioning or making small changes to an 
interview protocol, but other courts must decide those issues 
now as the criminal justice system responds to Crawford.  
This reaction to Crawford is neither unusual nor 
improper.  It appears, however, to be happening more quickly 
today than when Roberts was decided twenty-five years ago.  
The rapid exchange of information about a Supreme Court 
decision produces a quicker and broader spread of knowledge 
about an opinion than before, but it also permits a broader 
exchange of possible countermeasures and responses. 
The importance of considering how the bench and bar 
might respond to an opinion is highlighted by the absence of 
any discussion in Crawford about why confrontation doctrine 
might have gone in the wrong direction after Roberts.  Roberts 
required that a statement have indicia of reliability.323  It did 
not, however, state that particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness would permit the prosecution to use a hearsay 
statement; rather it said that a statement must be excluded 
unless the statement had particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.324  The Supreme Court twice rejected 
arguments that the right of confrontation could be satisfied by 
showing that the particular statement was reliable, first in 
Lee325 and then in Wright.326  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia did 
not have to search far to find examples of other courts citing 
Roberts for the reliability interpretation.327 
Crawford was not just a case about confrontation 
doctrine.  It was also a case about whether and how well the 
Supreme Court can provide guidance to other courts.  The 
conversion of Roberts from a decision requiring indicia of 
reliability to a rule permitting the prosecutor to use hearsay 
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after a judicial evaluation of reliability allowed other courts to 
create the appearance of applying Supreme Court doctrine 
without the reality.  Justice Scalia showed the depth of the 
problem in Crawford by comparing cases that showed how both 
a fact and its opposite could be presented in different opinions 
as evidence of reliability.328  If Crawford succeeds in changing 
confrontation doctrine, that change will come because it will no 
longer be enough to declare that a statement is reliable for it to 
be admissible. 
By itself, rejecting the reliability test will not 
necessarily eliminate the reasons that have led courts to admit 
hearsay statements under their interpretation of Roberts.  
After Crawford, those reasons might lead a court to declare a 
statement nontestimonial.  Whether that becomes the eventual 
response may depend on how well and how quickly the Court 
explains the principles other courts should use to recognize 
that a statement is testimonial. 
That still leaves open the question of whether 
abandoning any confrontation protection for nontestimonial 
statements would be the best way to bring certainty or stability 
to confrontation doctrine.  The appeal of the testimonial 
interpretation as a bright-line test rests on the assumptions 
that testimonial and nontestimonial statements are so clearly 
different that they can be readily distinguished, that the 
difference should be reflected in different confrontation 
requirements, and that the historical record supports the 
distinction and helps make the distinction.  The opinions of 
other courts have shown that the distinctions are not easy to 
make, particularly without any articulated principle to guide 
the analysis.329 
For example, an alleged accomplice may make 
accusations against a defendant in settings other than 
custodial interrogation.  Some may be made in wholly private 
settings.  If the difference in the setting for the accusation is 
the controlling factor, which category would be proper when an 
alleged accomplice makes the accusation in an apparently 
private setting that is actually a covert interrogation by an 
acquaintance who has agreed to be recorded by the police?  
Should the knowledge or expectation of the interrogator or the 
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accomplice govern whether the defendant has a right of 
confrontation? 
An accomplice’s accusation during custodial 
interrogation, a similar statement to a covert interrogator, and 
a similar private statement can be equally damaging to the 
defendant.  The absence of the declarant from trial would mean 
that the defendant’s inability to confront the declarant would 
be the same for all three statements.  The already apparent 
search for ways to step around the holding of Crawford would 
likely produce one immediate response if future decisions 
establish that statements produced by covert interrogation are 
nontestimonial:  the number of covert interrogations would 
increase.  Covert interrogation would become much more 
valuable because the resulting product could be used without 
confrontation if the declarant became unavailable. 
Crawford did not hold that private hearsay statements 
do not require some confrontation limits.  The statement by 
Justice Scalia about nontestimonial statements left open three 
possibilities – flexibility under Roberts, flexibility under some 
rule similar to Roberts, or no need for any confrontation 
analysis.330  As Justice Breyer did in his concurring opinion in 
Lilly,331 Justice Scalia has left a question that calls for further 
examination. 
B. Roots of a Pro-Confrontation Interpretation 
Was it necessary to abandon the text of the 
Confrontation Clause so quickly in trying to interpret and 
apply it?  The primary reason it has been treated as 
insufficient is that it does not provide any detailed instructions 
about how it should be applied.  The adoption process does not 
provide much help either because neither the ratification 
debates nor the record of the first Congress contain any 
detailed instructions.  The “faded parchment” image then 
suggests that applying history, policy, or some combination is 
all that is possible.  That appears to inevitably lead to the 
balancing approach rejected by Crawford. 
The alternative is to accept both the text and the record 
of the adoption process at face value.  The Framers provided no 
detailed information and knew they were not providing 
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complete instructions.  Speakers such as Abraham Holmes 
provided no detail because they were not lawyers and lacked 
the experience to provide details.  The absence of any evidence 
that the comments of the nonlawyers were corrected by judges 
or lawyers is itself evidence that those who might have thought 
about the actual application of the confrontation principle saw 
no need to speak.  There is no evidence anyone discussed what 
the right of confrontation might mean if the hearsay rule 
withered away because the hearsay rule was not essential to 
the right of confrontation. 
The ratification debates were about a political idea.  The 
ratification debates explain why there is a Confrontation 
Clause.  The discussion of confrontation in the ratification 
process and the inclusion of the right of confrontation in the 
Sixth Amendment provide some evidence that confrontation 
was a politically important idea.  The political idea of 
confrontation was left undefined in its details.  So were many 
political ideas such as religion, speech, search, seizure, 
jeopardy, counsel, and bail.  If the Framers saw that the Sixth 
Amendment did not define confrontation, then using English 
common law to fill in the details of confrontation may not be 
using the meaning of the Framers.  Suggesting that they 
meant something in-between inevitably becomes a search for 
hearsay the Framers would have permitted or excluded.  That 
search cannot avoid the assumption that the evolution of the 
hearsay rule was part of the original meaning as well.  Is it 
possible to ask what the Confrontation Clause might mean 
without a hearsay rule? 
American hearsay law and the right of confrontation 
have been so intertwined for so long that it may seem 
impossible to think about confrontation by itself.  It can be 
done, however.  The European Court of Human Rights has 
been developing a right of confrontation that applies across the 
Continent to national court systems that do not recognize a 
hearsay rule.332  The European confrontation right they are 
developing does not necessarily suggest how the Supreme 
Court should interpret the Sixth Amendment.  It is important 
as an example that it is possible to consider confrontation and 
hearsay separately. 
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There is a source for possible roots for an alternative 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions.  Some Justices have employed a pro-
confrontation approach to the Clause that has gotten too little 
notice for the way it differs from the more common anti-
hearsay approach.  The first time the Court mentioned the 
purpose of the Clause was in Mattox v. United States.333  In 
Mattox Justice Brown described the Clause’s “primary object” 
as “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits.”334  That anti-
hearsay description was sufficient on the facts of Mattox 
because the hearsay was prior testimony from the defendant’s 
first trial.335  The witnesses had died before the second trial,336 
but the fact that the defendant had cross-examined them at the 
first trial meant that the evidence had not been taken ex 
parte.337  
Four years later Justice Harlan did not use that anti-
hearsay perspective in Kirby v. United States.338  Kirby was a 
prosecution for receiving stolen federal property.  A federal 
statute provided that the judgment of conviction of the thief 
would be conclusive evidence in the trial of the alleged receiver 
that the property had been stolen.339  At trial, the prosecution 
had proved that the property was stolen by introducing the 
conviction record of the thieves and invoking the statute.  In 
his opinion for the Court, the first Justice Harlan reviewed 
English precedent and state decisions before concluding that 
the statute violated the Confrontation Clause.340  He explained 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it allowed the 
prosecutor to prove an element of the crime with the record 
from a different trial, instead of by calling a witness to testify 
about the facts.341  He also explained that the conviction record 
was not admissible for any purpose because the fact that the 
thief had been convicted was not an element of the crime of 
receiving stolen property.342 
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In Kirby, Justice Harlan made no effort to fit the Mattox 
model by describing the use of the conviction by the prosecution 
as similar to trial by affidavit.  Instead of using that anti-
hearsay perspective, Justice Harlan described the purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause from a pro-confrontation perspective 
as intended to require the prosecution to call witnesses the 
defendant could confront at trial.343  He mentioned Mattox only 
in stating that the circumstances of a dying declaration are 
equivalent to testimony at trial.344 
Both the anti-hearsay and pro-confrontation 
perspectives on the purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
reappeared when the modern era of confrontation doctrine 
began with Pointer v. Texas in 1965.  In that case, Justice 
Black described the purpose from a pro-confrontation 
perspective when he wrote that a “major reason underlying the 
constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged 
with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
against him.”345  On the same day, Justice Brennan used a pro-
confrontation perspective in Douglas v. Alabama, where he 
concluded that the Court’s confrontation cases “hold that a 
primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-
examination.”346  In Barber v. Page, Justice Marshall used both 
perspectives without suggesting they might be different.347  
When Justice Brennan wrote again in Bruton v. United States, 
he described the Confrontation Clause as directed against 
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination, but he 
cited only Justice Black’s opinion in Pointer and not his own 
opinion in Douglas.348 
The last appearance of the pro-confrontation perspective 
was no more than implicit and easily overshadowed by the 
Mattox anti-hearsay perspective.  In Green, Justice White 
stated that “it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at 
the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by 
the Confrontation Clause.”349  He followed that statement with 
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the quotation from Mattox that the object of the Clause was to 
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits.350 
Even as the pro-confrontation perspective was 
disappearing after Green, a related concept was first appearing 
in Dutton.  In his lead opinion in Dutton, Justice Stewart 
described the hearsay statement as spontaneous and against 
penal interest.351  He labeled those circumstances as “indicia of 
reliability” which allowed the prosecution to use the hearsay 
even though the defendant could not confront the declarant.352  
He cited no precedent for his statement that indicia of 
reliability were “widely viewed as determinative” of whether 
hearsay could be used without confrontation.353  Justice White 
had used “indicia of reliability” in Green in a reference to 
hearsay rules,354 but the Court had never before used that 
phrase in deciding whether there was a confrontation violation.  
Dutton has long been the hardest case to reconcile with any 
interpretation of the confrontation doctrine, but there is no 
need to do so here.  Dutton is important for a different idea. 
In Dutton, Justice Stewart also drew from Justice 
White’s opinion in Green in another way.  Justice White had 
said that confrontation at trial about an earlier statement “will 
still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement.”355  In Dutton, Justice Stewart 
used Justice White’s language in his own description that the 
“mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical 
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a 
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement.’”356  Justice Stewart described how the defendant 
had exercised his right to examine the witness who reported 
the hearsay statement, an examination the jury had heard.  He 
concluded that the possibility that cross-examination of the 
declarant “could conceivably have shown the jury that the 
statement, though made, might have been unreliable was 
wholly unreal.”357  One thing was different – Justice White had 
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described an effect of confrontation while Justice Stewart used 
the same language to describe its purpose.  One thing was the 
same – both Justices focused on a basis for the factfinder to 
evaluate reliability without mentioning reliability as a test for 
the judge’s ruling on admissibility. 
The last confrontation opinion from this era was written 
by then-Justice Rehnquist in Mancusi v. Stubbs.358  In Mancusi, 
the hearsay was testimony from a prior trial by a witness who 
was in Sweden and unavailable at the time of the second 
trial.359  Justice Rehnquist quoted both the “indicia of 
reliability” language from Dutton360 and the language about 
affording “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement” from Green.361  Justice 
Rehnquist listed both items jointly in his summary of Green 
and Dutton and in his conclusion.362 
Justice Blackmun relied on Mancusi twice in Roberts.  
In discussing the facts of Roberts in Part III, Justice Blackmun 
explained why examining the declarant at the pretrial hearing 
was sufficient.  He said that both the opportunity and use of 
the opportunity to examine meant that the transcript had 
“sufficient indicia of reliability” and that it “afforded the trier of 
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement.”363  For that proposition Justice Blackmum cited 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Mancusi for its quotation from 
Dutton, which in turn had quoted the language from Green.364 
Justice Blackmun also relied on Mancusi when he set 
out his general approach in Part II of Roberts.  He quoted the 
language from Mancusi that required both indicia of reliability 
and a satisfactory basis for the trier of fact to evaluate the 
truth of the statement.  However, Justice Blackmun also 
framed reliability from another perspective when he described 
the “underlying purpose” of the Clause as “to augment accuracy 
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an 
effective means to test adverse evidence.”365  Justice Blackmun 
described some hearsay exceptions as resting upon such a solid 
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foundation that virtually any evidence they allow would 
comport with the substance of the constitutional protection.  He 
cited Mattox and added a footnote that described a dying 
declaration, cross-examined prior-trial testimony, and business 
and public records as illustrations.366  As always, more 
discussion in the opinion might resolve some ambiguities, but 
the context can be read as an argument by Justice Blackmun 
that the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions he listed were ones 
that would still ensure the defendant an effective means to test 
adverse evidence and afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis 
for evaluating the truth of the statement. 
The Court’s best opportunity to develop the implications 
of the thinking behind Justice Blackmun’s general theory was 
Lee v. Illinois.367  In the majority opinion in Lee, Justice 
Brennan quoted the language from Roberts about providing the 
defendant with an effective means to test adverse evidence.368  
In his dissent in Lee, Justice Blackmun quoted the language 
from Roberts about affording the trier of fact a satisfactory 
basis for evaluating the truth of the statement.369  Neither 
Justice gave those quotations any further attention as they 
debated other issues in the case. 
The idea that the trier of fact should have a basis for 
evaluating a statement did not completely disappear.  For 
example, in Inadi Justice Powell explained why the prosecutor 
did not have to show the unavailability of the declarant of a co-
conspirator statement.370  He emphasized that the evidentiary 
significance of the particular evidence could not be replicated 
by having the declarant repeat it as testimony at trial.  His 
argument was strengthened by the fact that the specific co-
conspirator statements in Inadi had been captured on tape by 
the police.371  That meant the jury could actually listen to the 
defendants conspiring, possibly the closest practical equivalent 
to having the jury view the crime in progress.  Justice Powell 
did not discuss how the defendant could test the evidence, but 
his emphasis on the evidentiary value and significance of co-
conspirator statements appear to assume that the trier of fact 
will evaluate the statements they heard being made. 
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The Supreme Court’s recent precedent on courtroom 
confrontation has also emphasized that the purpose of 
confrontation is to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the 
evidence.  In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia described the Clause 
as a guarantee that the defendant would have “a face-to-face 
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”372  In 
Maryland v. Craig, Justice O’Connor described the purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause in similar terms as ensuring that 
evidence be subjected “to rigorous testing in the context of an 
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”373  The Chief 
Justice quoted that same language from Craig in his 
concurring opinion in Crawford.374 
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the Inadi analysis 
when he discussed excited utterances and statements for 
medical diagnosis in White.375  He described the contexts in 
which such statements are made as providing substantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness that support the hearsay 
exceptions.  In addition to describing firmly rooted exceptions 
as satisfying the confrontation test, the Chief Justice made a 
second point.  He described a statement made in a moment of 
excitement without an opportunity to reflect as possibly 
carrying more weight with a trier of fact than testimony.376  The 
Chief Justice described a statement for medical diagnosis 
where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause 
misdiagnosis or mistreatment as having guarantees of 
credibility “that a trier of fact may not think replicated by 
courtroom testimony.”377  He did not discuss whether the 
defendant would have any way to test such evidence, but for 
both kinds of statements he explicitly stated that the trier of 
fact would evaluate each statement. 
Various combinations of the pro-confrontation 
perspective have persisted in the Court’s confrontation 
doctrine.  That helps explain why Justice Scalia in Crawford 
could describe the results of the Court’s decisions as not 
inconsistent with his interpretation that the original meaning 
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did not include a reliability exception to the right of 
confrontation. 
The pro-confrontation perspective is not inconsistent 
with the holding of Crawford, but Justice Scalia’s emphasis on 
his anti-hearsay interpretation meant that the pro-
confrontation perspective was only an implicit part of his 
declaration that there could be no substitute for confrontation 
for a testimonial statement.  On the facts of Crawford, both 
perspectives lead to the same result. 
V. REBUILDING CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE AFTER 
CRAWFORD 
Confrontation doctrine can be rebuilt after Crawford, 
but a successful approach will avoid the obvious invitation to 
use historical research to produce a more precise definition of 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay.  The reason other 
courts were reaching incorrect conclusions before Crawford was 
not just Roberts and not just the reliability test.  Each played a 
role, but eliminating both did not get to the root of the problem.  
The problem began with the longstanding failure to question 
the assumption of both Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun 
that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was excluding 
certain kinds of hearsay.  Without that assumption, the 
historical record does not compel using the testimonial 
interpretation as the foundation for confrontation doctrine. 
An alternative interpretation would read the 
Confrontation Clause literally as requiring confrontation.  That 
interpretation would not change the effect of the Clause as a 
limit on the use of hearsay evidence by the prosecution.  It 
would describe a common purpose for the effect of the Clause 
on hearsay, as well as its effect on the ability of the prosecution 
to use testimony from a witness who refuses to answer 
questions on cross-examination.  It would also set forth a 
common purpose for its effect on testimony from a witness 
hidden behind a screen, and its effect on taking testimony 
while the defendant is excluded from the courtroom.  It would 
avoid the apparent discordance of describing the purpose of the 
Clause as only one of the several effects it has on criminal 
trials. 
Interpreting the Confrontation Clause as requiring 
confrontation would not mean that a prosecutor could never 
present any evidence about out-of-court statements.  The 
Supreme Court opinions that have identified two elements of 
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the right of confrontation would allow the prosecution to use an 
out-of-court statement if those two elements are met:  the 
defendant must have an effective means to contest the evidence 
and the trier of fact must be able to assess the evidence. 
There are two questions to ask about any interpretation 
of the Confrontation Clause or Crawford.  The first is whether 
it is consistent with the Court’s established confrontation 
doctrine.  The second is how well it provides guidance for issues 
that have not yet been decided.  Subpart A will describe how 
interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation is more than 
just consistent with every Court opinion including Crawford; it 
can also be helpful in understanding the limits of some of the 
opinions.  Subpart B will sketch how interpreting the Clause as 
requiring confrontation can provide guidance for addressing 
the issues left unanswered by Crawford. 
A. Understanding Established Confrontation Doctrine 
The rules the Supreme Court has applied in prior cases 
for several kinds of hearsay are consistent with the Court’s two 
elements of confrontation.  For example, the established rule 
that allows the prosecution to use the prior testimony of an 
unavailable witness requires showing that there had been 
actual cross-examination of the witness at the prior hearing.  
The Court explained that prior cross-examination is the feature 
that ensures that the defendant has an effective means to 
contest the evidence in both Green378 and Roberts.379  The 
transcript of the examination and cross-examination will 
provide the jury with a basis for evaluating the prior 
testimony. 
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use 
any prior statements of a witness at trial requires that the 
defendant be able to cross-examine the witness at trial about 
the prior statement.  In Part II of Green, the Court explained 
that cross-examination at trial gives the defendant an effective 
means to contest the evidence and provides the jury with a 
basis for evaluating the prior statement.380 
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use a 
co-conspirator statement that was made in the course and 
scope of the conspiracy applies to statements that have the 
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evidentiary significance described in Inadi381 and Bourjaily.382  
While both Inadi and Bourjaily involved recorded statements 
that could be played for the jury, neither opinion treated that 
fact as important.  Both opinions described co-conspirator 
statements in general as having evidentiary significance the 
jury can evaluate.383 
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use 
an excited utterance may apply only to truly immediately 
excited statements if the Court accepts Justice Scalia’s footnote 
in Crawford384 as a refinement of White.385  Without the 
declarant as a witness, the prosecution would have to present 
the statement through the testimony of someone who was 
present to hear it.  If the statement immediately follows the 
startling event, the witness will be present for the startling 
event to observe the context of the statement.  That testimony 
would give the defendant an effective means to contest the 
evidence and the jury a basis for evaluating the statement.  
Requiring immediacy would prevent using the excited 
utterance exception to admit reports of past crimes; however, 
no Supreme Court decision supports that use of the exception.  
The inability of the defendant to ask the witness at trial about 
the context of a startling event they did not observe and the 
inability of the factfinder to evaluate that context explain why 
the Court might hold that immediacy is a condition for 
satisfying the right of confrontation. 
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use a 
statement that was made for medical care could still be refined 
by the Court.  The outer limits of the rule were not defined in 
White because the Court in that case did no more than assume 
the statements properly fit within the hearsay exception.386  
Perhaps White would have been decided differently if it had 
been heard after the Court held in Williamson that a hearsay 
statement must be parsed to admit only the portion that is 
against the declarant’s penal interest.387  Then the Court in 
White might have given more attention to parsing the medical 
care statements into those that were relevant to the need for 
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actual medical care and those that were relevant only to other 
purposes such as law enforcement.  For a statement specifically 
relevant to medical care, the context, purpose, and significance 
of the statement could be reported by the medical personnel 
who heard it.  That would mean there would be a factual basis 
that would give the defendant an effective means to contest the 
statement and would give the jury a basis for evaluating the 
statement. 
Out-of-court statements offered for some purpose other 
than proving the truth of the assertion should generally not 
raise a confrontation issue.388  The Supreme Court has not held 
that the scope of the confrontation right is limited to the 
definition of hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), but 
the Court has suggested there is no confrontation issue if a 
statement is not used to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.389  Testimony that provides background or explains 
the significance of an event can be attacked by the defendant 
and evaluated by the factfinder whether or not it involves a 
prior statement if the statement is not being used for a hearsay 
purpose.  That does not mean that other courts could use the 
kind of strained misinterpretation of when evidence is being 
used for a hearsay purpose that had permitted the use of co-
defendant plea allocutions that was criticized in Crawford.390 
Interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation 
would leave some incomplete areas of confrontation doctrine 
unchanged.  For example, the current interpretation that the 
Clause allows the prosecution to introduce a dying declaration 
would remain undefined for the same reason this rule was not 
fully defined before Crawford – the Supreme Court has never 
decided a case involving a dying declaration.  The forfeiture 
rule would remain partially defined because the Supreme 
Court’s only application of the forfeiture principle in United 
States v. Reynolds considered only a single set of facts.391 
Interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation 
would not change the conclusions in Lee,392 Lilly,393 and 
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Crawford394 that those custodial statements against penal 
interest were inadmissible because the accomplice did not 
testify.  It would not change the holding in Wright that the 
victim’s report was inadmissible.395  In all of these cases the 
defendant’s inability to confront the declarant left the 
defendant with no effective means to contest the out-of-court 
statement and provided the factfinder without a sufficient 
basis to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. 
B. Addressing Future Issues 
The categories the Supreme Court has found admissible 
and clearly inadmissible include a substantial percentage of 
the hearsay that typically is contested.  Nevertheless, 
confrontation doctrine is still a work in progress.  There are 
gaps in the established rules for hearsay such as business 
records and official records.  The previously established rules 
may not provide clear answers for statements made possible by 
911 calls or statements in developing areas of the law such as 
domestic abuse cases.  There is no reason to expect that 
Crawford will directly answer every question about 
confrontation doctrine. 
The importance of a precise distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements will not be 
apparent until the Court defines the rule for nontestimonial 
statements.  The difficulty of defining a rule for nontestimonial 
statements will depend on whether the Court tries to announce 
a single comprehensive rule or decides that it can develop a set 
of rules in the common law manner by addressing the facts of 
one particular case at a time.  Crawford did not endorse any 
rule the Supreme Court must follow when it eventually does 
address the right of confrontation for nontestimonial hearsay.  
When it does, Crawford suggests the Court may ask whether 
other courts have developed a coherent body of doctrine that is 
consistent with the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. 
Other courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel have 
resources they can use to understand and apply Crawford 
while they must wait for the Supreme Court to provide further 
guidance.  They can address the most important issues by 
recognizing that the Confrontation Clause was adopted to 
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require confrontation and not just to exclude hearsay.  They 
can consider whether admitting the particular kind of hearsay 
would be consistent with that purpose by focusing on the 
defendant’s ability to contest the evidence and whether the 
factfinder has a sufficient basis for evaluating the truth of a 
prior statement.  That interpretation does not lead to the 
judicial screening for reliability that was rejected in Crawford.  
The questions are not whether the trial judge thinks the 
defendant needs to contest the evidence or whether the trial 
judge can evaluate the truth of the hearsay. 
The Supreme Court could best continue its development 
of confrontation doctrine by interpreting the Confrontation 
Clause to require confrontation and focusing on the two 
elements of confrontation to decide whether the prosecution 
can use a particular kind of hearsay.  That interpretation 
would recognize that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause 
in the Sixth Amendment gave the courts both the duty to 
protect the right of confrontation and the responsibility to 
reevaluate confrontation doctrine as evidence law might 
change. 
Justice Scalia declared in Crawford that the Court had 
to reject the reliability exception in order to make confrontation 
doctrine consistent with the historical record.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the Court did not have to freeze 
confrontation doctrine with a new categorical rule.  Despite 
their apparent debate in Crawford, perhaps they were both 
right. 
